When Bangladeshis talk about the wider Muslim world, Türkiye always gets a very special place in the imagination. It is not just another friendly country for Bangladesh, but it feels like a brother state that lives in Bangladesh’s history books, religious memory, popular culture, and increasingly in foreign policy debates. That is why the way Türkiye is now being mentioned in Bangladesh’s domestic politics deserves some reflection from both Dhaka and Ankara.
Following the dramatic fall of the Awami League government on 5 August 2024, the 2026 national election on 12th February will be crucial to hand over power to an elected political government. Bangladeshi people want a government elected through a credible vote. The interim government will not allow the Awami League to participate in the election. The main contest is likely to be between a centrist coalition led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and an Islamist bloc in which Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamic parties hope to perform better than ever before. Several surveys conducted in late 2024 and 2025 suggest that the BNP-led coalition is ahead in terms of projected seats, but also that the Islamist bloc is gaining ground.
For fifty-four years, Bangladesh’s politics has largely revolved around three blocs: a Bengali nationalist camp historically represented by the Awami League, a centrist Bangladeshi nationalist camp represented by the BNP, and an Islamist camp represented by Jamaat and smaller Islamic parties. They differ on ideology, history and nationalism. Yet one habit cuts across all three political blocs they often use foreign relations as a tool of domestic politics. There is a widespread perception in Bangladesh that the Awami League leaned heavily on its relationship with India to comfort its own base and sideline critics. Islamist parties, in turn, increasingly highlight their ties with Middle Eastern countries to impress supporters and claim that powerful “brotherly” regimes stand behind them. Foreign policy becomes campaign material.
In the short term, this can be useful. It allows parties to tell their supporters: “Look, we are not alone, powerful friends abroad are with us.” In the long term, it damages both the country’s foreign relations and the reputation of those external partners inside Bangladesh. The repeated use of India’s name as a political symbol is a clear example. It has contributed to a deep pool of anti-India sentiment in parts of Bangladeshi society, which now complicates cooperation on trade, water sharing and border management. The concern today is that some actors may try to repeat the same pattern with Türkiye and other Muslim-majority countries.
Türkiye’s place in the Bangladeshi mind is different from that of any regional great power. Geographically, it is distant. Emotionally and historically, it is close. When British colonial power moved to dismantle the Ottoman Caliphate and humiliate Sultan Abdul Hamid, Bengali Muslims helped organise the Khilafat Movement in clear solidarity with Türkiye. They were still subjects of the British Empire, but their hearts were with Istanbul. Generations of Sufi saints, traders and soldiers with roots in Turkish or Turkic lands travelled across the Hindu Kush, through North India, and finally into the Bengal delta. They helped shape the religious practices, cuisine and even the moral vocabulary of Bengali Muslims. Many of the most respected Sufi figures whose shrines are visited in today’s Bangladesh are remembered as coming from west of our region, including from Turkish backgrounds.
In recent years, Turkish television dramas on historical figures have found a large and loyal audience in Bangladesh. For many young people, these shows offer a blend of faith, history and modern political imagination. Türkiye appears as a living story that connects to the Bangladesh youth’s own past and their sense of dignity as Muslims. This affection cuts across party lines. Bengali nationalists, Bangladeshi nationalists and Islamists may disagree on almost everything at home, but they usually speak of Türkiye with respect.
This reflects Türkiye’s preference for a state-to-state approach, grounded in constructive, friendly, and fraternal relations. Maintaining this framework is essential, as perceptions shaped by domestic political dynamics can evolve over time. Experiences elsewhere suggest that sentiments initially marked by warmth and goodwill may, if politicised, later give rise to misunderstanding or unease.
As Bangladesh approaches its elections, political mobilisation naturally intensifies. In such periods, references to external relationships may occasionally surface in public discourse. While these may generate short-term domestic resonance, associating bilateral ties with internal political narratives risks creating longer-term sensitivities. For this reason, preserving cooperation at the state-to-state level, rather than allowing it to be interpreted through partisan lenses, remains in the long-term interest of both Ankara and Dhaka.
From a Bangladeshi perspective, the healthiest path forward for Türkiye–Bangladesh relations is clear. The relationship should remain strictly state to state, grounded in institutions, not personalities or party networks. Türkiye has so far largely avoided being seen as backing a particular party in Bangladesh. Preserving that perception is crucial.
There is huge potential to deepen cooperation in practical, structured ways. Bangladesh is actively trying to diversify its security and economic partnerships in a difficult South Asian neighbourhood. Turkish defence technology already attracts serious attention among Bangladeshi policymakers. Beyond defence, there is room to expand industrial investment, infrastructure projects, educational exchanges, research collaboration and scholarships. People to people ties are equally important. The Bangladeshi diaspora in Türkiye can be a bridge in trade, tourism and cultural understanding. For that, it is better if diaspora networks are not used to export Bangladeshi party rivalries into Turkish society. Ordinary Bangladeshis admire Türkiye is broad and non-partisan. It would be wise to keep it that way.
Türkiye has never been part of the oppressive chapters of Bengal’s history. In Bangladesh’s historical memory, Türkiye appears instead as a victim of empire and a symbol of Muslim resistance. Bengali Muslims once stood up for the Ottoman Caliphate while living under British rule. That memory still carries weight. Today, an independent Bangladesh wants to turn this emotional legacy into a modern partnership based on trade, technology and shared security interests, not on slogans in an election rally. For that to succeed, political parties in Bangladesh need to resist the temptation to wave Türkiye’s name as a campaign flag. And friendly states, including Türkiye, need to continue engaging with Bangladesh at an official, institutional level without being drawn into internal quarrels.
