The 12-day war reshapes Trump-Netanyahu ties, while Gaza violence and Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights stall the Abraham Accords
After a 12-day war between Israel and Iran, the fate of the conflict as well as the future of the Middle East will remain unsolved in many ways. Although there have been statements from Israeli officials suggesting a regime change in Iran, the attacks have not escalated to such a level. On the other hand, the extent of the damage caused by the United States’ strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities remains uncertain.
Iran, having experienced a violation of its airspace by Israel and failed to prevent an Israeli intelligence operation within its own territory, has suffered a significant blow. However, considering the possibility that Iran’s nuclear weapons activities may resume, the 12-day war yields questionable gains for both Israel and the U.S. Israel’s redirection of its long-standing occupation and massacre policies toward a sovereign state has emerged as a serious source of concern for the broader Middle East. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump seeks to transform these developments into a political triumph for himself and build his Middle East policy upon this foundation.
Considering that the primary issue on the agenda before Israel attacks Iran was the deteriorating relationship between Trump and Netanyahu, it is crucial to analyze the points at which the regional visions of the U.S. and Israel converge and diverge. Examining the potential transformation of this relationship into a stable alliance between leaders following the attacks on Iran would offer valuable insights into the future trajectory of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Furthermore, in this evolving regional landscape, the role and significance of the Abraham Accords will be of critical importance in shaping new alliance structures throughout the region.
Trump’s ideal Middle East
In Trump’s perception, the Middle East is a complex region in which local states engage in pointless wars, while the U.S. bears unnecessary costs as a result of its entanglement in these conflict zones. His rhetoric and policies during his first presidential term reflected an aim to reduce the American presence in the region by reconciling the actors who, in his own words, “have been at war for hundreds or even thousands of years.”
The underlying logic behind the Abraham Accords emerged from this approach. The core objective was to establish a new regional order grounded in cooperation and economic development by spearheading peace agreements between Israel and other regional countries. In doing so, it was envisioned that a stable region could be built in which American military presence would no longer be required. Although this policy was quite rational at the strategic level – especially for a U.S. increasingly oriented toward competition with China, it faced significant practical obstacles. Most notably, following the Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent genocidal campaign in Gaza, the prospect of Gulf states signing peace accords with Israel became virtually impossible. Consequently, the regional vision that Trump had sought to implement, namely, securing Israel through the Abraham Accords and resolving the Iranian issue through nuclear negotiations, foundered on the ground.
In short, Trump’s envisioned Middle East, with its security architecture centered on Israel and the Gulf states, a region-wide economic cooperation led by the U.S., and a system wherein Iran would be contained through local allies, clashed with regional realities. Moreover, as nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran were still ongoing, Israel’s attack on Iran created a new dynamic in which Trump found himself following Israel’s lead rather than shaping regional developments. Thus, Trump’s vision for the Middle East gradually shifted to a “post-Iran” framework influenced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s agenda, with a cease-fire in Gaza becoming its foundational component. It is precisely for this reason that analyzing the Trump-Netanyahu relationship can offer valuable insight into the future contours of the “new” Middle East.
A love and hate relationship
As he emphasised throughout his electoral campaign, Trump sought to build a foreign policy centered on reducing costs, prioritizing the resolution of conflicts such as the war in Ukraine and Israel’s occupation of Gaza. However, he failed to achieve the desired flexibility from both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Ukraine crisis and, on the other hand, was unable to persuade Netanyahu to end the hostilities in Gaza. At this juncture, engaging in nuclear negotiations with Iran gained increased strategic value for Trump. Despite conflicting statements from the White House, Trump’s primary objective was to reach a deal with Iran and secure a significant foreign policy achievement.
However, it has become evident that Trump’s approach has failed to yield results both in Ukraine and in efforts to broker a cease-fire in Gaza or conduct negotiations with Iran. This failure, in turn, created the opportunity that Netanyahu had been seeking.
In recent months, Trump removed several figures from his foreign policy team who could be classified as neoconservatives; notably, he dismissed his national security advisor, Mike Waltz, due to the latter’s unauthorized cooperation with Netanyahu on plans to bomb Iran. While these developments reflect Trump’s non-interventionist stance toward the Middle East and his opposition to military action against Iran, the unilateral nature of Netanyahu’s assault ultimately forced the United States to participate in the strike against Iran. Thus, although Trump and Netanyahu had previously disagreed on a range of issues – including lifting sanctions on Syria and establishing a cease-fire in Gaza – the current circumstances have led both leaders to converge on the same position.
Nevertheless, the meanings attributed to the Abraham Accords by both parties reveal a significant divergence. For Trump, these agreements served as a strategic instrument to guarantee Israel’s security while enabling the withdrawal of the U.S. from the region. In contrast, for Netanyahu and the Israeli state, the accords represent a mechanism through which Israel’s destabilizing policies of aggression and massacre in the region could go unpunished, while simultaneously nullifying the influence of the Gulf states on the Palestinian issue. As a result of this conflicting vision, the relationship between Trump and Netanyahu oscillates continuously between admiration and antagonism, a pendulum of political affection and resentment shaped by divergent strategic imperatives.
Side effects: New Syria
Within this broader equation, a recent claim reported by the international media suggests that Syria and Israel are on the verge of signing a peace agreement as part of the Abraham Accords framework. Following Trump’s decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria, the new Damascus administration has sought to reintegrate into the international community and global economy. Within Trump’s vision of a restructured Middle East, it appears conceivable that Syria, too, could be drawn into a peace arrangement with Israel.
Nevertheless, statements from the Syrian government indicate that such an agreement is unfeasible unless Israel withdraws from the territories it has occupied in violation of the 1974 disengagement agreement. Moreover, the ongoing rivalry between Israel and Türkiye, which has increasingly centered on developments in Syria, underscores the tense environment created by Israel’s expansionist policies. Therefore, contrary to recent speculations, the prevailing conditions do not appear conducive to any substantive agreement between Israel and Syria.
Nonetheless, it appears highly unlikely that the Abraham Accords – devoid of any meaningful resolution concerning Gaza and the broader Palestinian question – can be effectively implemented or bring about the envisioned security and stability in the region. At this juncture, what the Trump administration ought to pursue is not the coercion of Saudi Arabia or Syria into signing the Abraham Accords, but rather the cessation of Israel’s massacres in Gaza and the termination of its occupation in Syria. Only under such conditions might a window of opportunity emerge for these countries to consider establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.
In conclusion, while Israel under Netanyahu may be attempting to construct a “new Middle East,” formidable obstacles stand in the way of institutionalizing such a transformation. On one hand, although Iran’s regional strategy has been dealt a substantial blow, the atrocities committed by Israel in Gaza render it highly improbable that the Gulf states will integrate into the Abraham Accords framework. On the other hand, by intensifying its occupation of Syria, Israel not only jeopardizes Syria’s stability and security but also adopts an increasingly aggressive posture in its regional rivalry with Türkiye.
In sum, for Israel to secure the region and for Trump’s envisioned cooperative and stable Middle East to materialize, Israel must first undergo a fundamental transformation. However, such a transformation under Netanyahu’s leadership appears unlikely. This, in turn, makes it almost inevitable that the seemingly close Trump-Netanyahu relationship will once again deteriorate in the future.
