One year has passed since the December 8th Revolution in Syria. The Syrian people poured into the streets to celebrate the overthrow of the Ba’ath dictatorship after 13 years of bloody civil war. It is possible to say that in the year since the December 8th Revolution, Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Shara, has made an extraordinary effort to heal the wounds of the civil war and get his country back on its feet. The rapid integration of the al-Shara administration into the international system and the lifting of US economic sanctions against Syria can be cited as major gains achieved in a short time. On the other hand, the aggressive and expansionist policies of Israel, the Druze and Alawite uprisings, and the integration problem of the SDF/YPG can be expressed as the most serious challenges faced by the al-Shara administration within the first year. Nevertheless, we can say that the doors to a new and hopeful era have been opened for the Syrian people with the December 8th Revolution.
When examining the messages delivered by Ahmed al-Shara since the revolution, it is evident that the construction of a state with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force occupies a central place. Al-Shara regards the new Syrian army as the only way to protect his country’s unitary structure and territorial integrity. This article will address the distance covered in the formation of the new Syrian army since the December 8th Revolution and will discuss why a unified army is essential.
Unification of Armed Groups After the December 8th Revolution
During the civil war, the domination of various armed groups in different regions of Syria led to the fragmentation of state authority and the disappearance of the state’s monopoly on the instruments of violence. Looking at the situation on the ground before the December 8th Revolution, there was a scenario where Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies dominated in Idlib, the Syrian National Army (SNA) along the Turkish border, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast, and Druze militias and US-allied moderate opposition forces in the south near the Jordanian border.
The overthrow of the Assad regime by HTS-led opposition forces on December 8, 2024, brought forth the possibility of the Syrian state regaining the legitimate monopoly on the use of force after 13 years. The most urgent issue Al-Shara faced immediately after the revolution was the collection of weapons held by opposition groups, the consolidation of these groups under a single umbrella, and their integration into a unified, centralized army. In this context, Al-Shara emphasized that all military groups must dissolve themselves and join the state institutions. Al-Shara held meetings with the commanders of the opposition groups in Damascus, and on December 24, 2024, it was announced that all revolutionary groups had agreed to dissolve themselves and join the Ministry of Defense.
In this process, Al-Shara’s close associates, Murhaf Abu Qasra and Ali Noureddine Nasan, were promoted to Major General. Qasra was appointed as the Minister of Defense, while Nasan became the Chief of General Staff. Qasra and Nasan rolled up their sleeves to consolidate the armed groups under the sole umbrella of the state-affiliated army and police forces. By January 2025, about 70 armed groups operating across the entire Syrian theater, extending from the coast to the east and from the north to the south, began to join the new administration. However, the militia forces operating in the Druze region and the SDF did not respond positively to the integration calls.
During the Victory Conference convened on January 29, 2025, Al-Shara was accepted as the head of the transitional government, and the dissolution of all opposition parties and armed groups was officially declared. While HTS and SNA disbanded themselves, the SDF and Druze militias did not attend the conference. The SDF refused to lay down its arms, citing that it was defending against the SNA, while Defense Minister Qasra stated that he found the SDF leader Mazloum Abdi’s proposal to join the Syrian army as a semi-autonomous bloc unacceptable and accused the SDF of employing delaying tactics for negotiations. In this period, Türkiye also stated that the existence of armed opposition groups must cease, and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced that 80,000 SNA soldiers would join the new Syrian army.
Al-Shara and the representatives of the transitional government underlined that their primary goal was to build a new national army with a centralized command system and an official military hierarchy. Defense Minister Qasra, in a statement on May 17, 2025, announced that all military units had been gathered under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense and that the military structure had been integrated into a single institutional framework, noting this as a significant achievement. Qasra emphasized that all remaining small military groups must join the army within 10 days and announced that those who failed to comply would be punished. In this process, 130 military groups were attached to the Ministry of Defense. The SDF, which signed the March 10th agreement with the Damascus administration, was exempted from Qasra’s announcement. Similarly, the Druze militia structures operating in Suwayda also remained outside the integration framework put forth by Qasra.
The New Syrian Army: Risks and Opportunities
Although significant steps have been taken towards the formation of the new Syrian army following the December 8th Revolution, several risks still remain. Chief among these risks are the issues of the army’s financing and logistical capacity. Despite support from Türkiye, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, Syria requires indigenous resources to stand on its own feet. In this context, the oil fields in eastern Syria are extremely critical for the construction of the army and the state. However, the SDF/YPG continues to resist and is unwilling to integrate with Damascus despite the March 10th Memorandum of Understanding. Türkiye and the Al-Shara administration, which have declared the implementation of the March 10th Memorandum as a red line, are increasingly being forced toward a military operation. A comprehensive military operation against the SDF, in an environment where the situation in Syria has not yet stabilized, could challenge the Syrian army. Yet, the construction of the new army does not seem possible without resolving the SDF issue.
Another matter is that, despite all the positive steps taken for the army’s formation, time is needed for the development of institutional habits and a professional military structure. The necessary infrastructure for the training, equipment, and provisioning of the new Syrian army, which is composed of various opposition groups, is not fully established. Here, the 600 Israeli air strikes carried out against Syria after the December 8th Revolution must be highlighted. As a result of these attacks, Syria’s military infrastructure and arsenals have been destroyed. The 184 aircraft belonging to the Syrian Air Force have been almost completely annihilated. Billions of dollars are required to rebuild the Syrian air force and defense infrastructure. In short, the Al-Shara administration needs time and money.
The most significant opportunity for the New Syria is the support of Türkiye. First and foremost, Türkiye has stood by the just struggle of the Syrian people since the first day of the revolution. Türkiye is the biggest supporter and ally of the Al-Shara administration. The military cooperation memorandum signed between Türkiye and Syria on August 13, 2025, following the Suwayda incidents and the Israeli attacks that erupted in July, is highly important. Türkiye has committed to providing explicit support to the Damascus administration for the training and equipping of the new Syrian army. The support of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) will play a critical role in the construction of the Syrian army.
Conclusion: Why a Unified Army is Important
It is essential for the Al-Shara administration to establish a national and unified army to secure Syria’s unity and integrity. The presence of different armed groups operating within the country increases political risks. The possibility of regional actors like Israel interfering in Syria’s internal affairs and undermining the environment of stability and security through proxy actors is heightened. The New Syrian Army must encompass all the country’s constituents based on citizenship and adopt a perspective that prioritizes the security of all of Syria, rather than the security of ethnic or sectarian groups.
The state holding the monopoly on the use of force will shape not only Syria’s political future but also its economic future. It will be difficult for investors and international donors to come to Syria in an environment lacking security and where various armed groups operate. In a Syria where political instability and the risk of conflict prevail, pressures for foreign intervention will be felt more intensely. For the New Syria to possess a unified army and proceed confidently into the future, the issue of the SDF/YPG must be resolved urgently.
This article was first published on the Türkiye Research Foundation’s website on December 10, 2025.
