The civil war that erupted in Sudan in April 2023 has led to unprecedented devastation, resulting in hundreds of thousands of fatalities and the displacement of millions of people. Most recently, in July 2025, rebel commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti) declared himself the head of a parallel administration. With this development, the country is effectively divided into two separate authorities. This situation poses a serious threat to Sudan’s unity. Consequently, the key to lasting peace lies not in illegitimate secessionist attempts but in the reunification of the country under its legitimate government.

The Devastating Toll of the Civil War

The human cost of this war is of horrifying magnitude. Millions of people are struggling to survive, deprived of food, medical care, and necessities. During the conflicts, severe human rights violations—including extrajudicial killings, ethnic violence, and looting—have occurred; this situation has consequently caused instability not only within Sudan but also in neighboring countries. The situation in the Darfur region remains critical. The siege of El-Fasher, which lasted for months, left hundreds of thousands of civilians facing the danger of starvation and epidemic diseases. In summary, the civil war in Sudan has become an outright humanitarian and social catastrophe.

Hemeti’s “Parallel Government” Move

Unable to shift the military balance on the ground in his favor, Hemeti made a striking political move at the end of July 2025. He declared a parallel administration, which he named the “Government of Peace and Unity” in the country’s western regions under his control. During a ceremony held in the city of Nyala, Hemeti declared himself “President” of this so-called government and was sworn into office, appointing rebel leader Abdulaziz al-Hilu as his deputy and former minister Mohammed Hassan al-Ta’ishi as Prime Minister. While announced on paper with rhetoric such as “freedom, justice, and equality,” this structure is a coalition of warlords, with armed group leaders being appointed as ministers and council members.

Hemeti’s initiative immediately met with sharp backlash at both national and international levels. Many countries and regional organizations, including the African Union and the Arab League, rejected this parallel government declared in Nyala, characterizing it as an illegitimate entity. The African Union emphasized that this step threatens Sudan’s unity and undermines peace efforts, while United Nations officials warned that declaring a parallel government would deepen the conflict. Saudi Arabia, for its part, called on the parties to avoid the risk of the country being divided and descending into chaos. On the other hand, Hemeti’s move failed to secure complete unity even within his own ranks; some commanders and advisors of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) reacted negatively to the decision and announced their separation from the group. Some militias fighting on the front lines also criticized the leadership, claiming they were excluded from the newly formed structure. Ultimately, the “parallel government” initiative failed to create a unified force even within the Hemeti faction.

Legitimate Governance and the International Stance

The international community is of the view that a resolution in Sudan is only possible through strengthening the legitimate and recognized government and preserving the country’s unity. Indeed, the African Union announced that it recognizes only the transitional Sovereign Council, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the civilian administration based in Port Sudan, as the official authority of Sudan. This transitional government, which includes the appointed Prime Minister Kamil Idris, is still accepted as the sole legitimate administration of Sudan, and all diplomatic engagements are conducted with it. The majority of the Arab world and neighboring countries have also declared that they will not recognize the parallel formation, which they view as Hemeti’s “militia government.” This resolute stance by regional and international actors is based on the principle of protecting Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Various steps are being taken on both the military and diplomatic fronts to enable the legitimate government to restore stability to the country. In March 2025, army units achieved a strategic advantage by largely clearing Khartoum and its surroundings of the RSF. The focus is now shifting to isolating the rebel forces in the western part of the country. In the diplomatic arena, sanctions aimed at severing support from actors providing external financing and arms to the RSF are being implemented. The objective is thus to dry up Hemeti’s foreign resources and compel him toward a compromise. Furthermore, the transitional government led by Burhan maintains its commitment to returning the country to democratic rule following the end of the war. It is emphasized that lasting peace first requires the establishment of nationwide unity and legitimacy, followed by the construction of an inclusive civilian order.

Potential Scenarios

Three potential scenarios are on the table for Sudan. The first is that the country could remain de facto divided into east and west should the presence of two separate authorities become permanent. Although this “two-government” scenario might bring a balance that temporarily freezes the conflict, it carries the long-term risk of leading to Sudan’s formal fragmentation.

The second scenario involves the failure of the parallel initiative and the removal of the threat of partition, thanks to the resolute stance of the international community. Indeed, the world refuses to grant legitimacy to this parallel structure, defending Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as a fundamental principle.

The third and most promising scenario is the cessation of hostilities and the reunification of the country under a single, legitimate administration. It can thus be argued that lasting peace and stability in Sudan are only achievable through reunification, founded upon this basis of unity.

This article was first published on the Türkiye Research Foundation’s Turkish website on September 3, 2025.