Somaliland is a region that declared its secession from Somalia in 1991, adopted the name “Republic of Somaliland” and whose borders essentially correspond to the British Somaliland Protectorate (formerly British Somaliland). The historical background of this claim to statehood dates back to the 1960 unification: During the colonial period, the territory of Somalia was divided into two separate administrative units—British Somaliland in the north and Somalia under UN trusteeship (formerly Italian Somaliland) in the south. The administration of the State of Somaliland, proclaimed on June 26, 1960, in the north (Prime Minister Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal) and the administration of the trusteeship government in the south, which gained independence on July 1, 1960 (Prime Minister Abdullahi Issa Mohamud), and with the approval of the legislative bodies on both sides, the two units united on July 1, 1960, under the name of the Republic of Somalia. The decision to unite was based on the prevailing political ideology of the time—Somali nationalism and the pan-Somali unity movement—with the expectation of consolidating the fragmented administrative structure under a single national umbrella and strengthening the new state’s institutional capacity through international recognition.
Following the collapse of central authority as a result of the Somali Civil War, the Somaliland administration declared in May 1991 that the 1960 unification was null and void, and asserted its independence. Since then, Somaliland has effectively maintained an independent structure in its internal affairs, holding elections that approximate democracy and establishing institutions that uphold public order. However, this independence has not been generally recognized by the international community. Aside from the five-day period in 1960 when it was independent (during which the United Kingdom and a few other countries granted temporary recognition), no UN member state has recognized Somaliland as a state since 1991. Israel announced on December 26, 2025, that it was the first country to officially recognize Somaliland’s independence. This decision was condemned as “illegal” by the Somali government and many other countries; in particular, Somalia stated that the decision constituted an attack on its sovereignty. This article will comprehensively examine the validity and legal basis of Israel’s recognition decision under international law, as well as the geopolitical motivations behind it.
The History and Current Legal Status of Somaliland
The historical background of the Somaliland region is rooted in an ancient geography that is regarded as the “homeland” in the collective memory of Somali communities. During the modern colonial era, the region was organized under separate administrative structures: in the north as the British Somaliland Protectorate (formerly “British Somaliland”), and in the south as Italian Somaliland, which operated under a distinct colonial-administrative system. On June 26, 1960, British Somaliland declared its short-lived independence under the name “State of Somaliland”; however, this status came to an end on July 1, 1960, with the political unification of the region with Italian Somaliland in the south. Thus, the merger of these two entities—each with distinct colonial legacies and administrative experiences—led to the establishment of the Republic of Somalia, in pursuit of the goal of national unity. However, this unification, lacking lasting institutional harmony and an inclusive political consensus, led to the establishment of an authoritarian Somali regime following Siad Barre’s coup on December 31, 1969, and subsequently triggered a civil war and anarchy that lasted for many years. During the internal conflicts that began in the 1980s, the Barre regime was overthrown in 1991, and the country descended into chaos. At that time, the former British Somaliland region separated from Somalia’s failing state structure and began to manage its own internal affairs. In May 1991, Somaliland declared the 1960 unification of Somalia null and void; since then, it has continued to exist as a de facto independent administration with its own constitution, parliament, and governing institutions. The Somaliland administration has rebuilt infrastructure, held regular elections, and even issued its own currency. Today, with a population of approximately 4–6 million, it appears to have achieved a relatively stable level of security and governance. However, from the perspective of the international community, Somaliland is still considered to be within the borders of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Just as no UN member state has de facto recognized it, international organizations have also not recognized Somaliland as a separate state. The only exception regarding Somaliland prior to Israel’s recognition was its brief recognition during the five-day period when it was independent in 1960. For this reason, with its recognition in late 2025, Israel became the first country to declare Somaliland (Somaliland) an independent state.
The African Union’s Border Policies and Principles of Recognition
The African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity – AU/OAU) is an institutional framework designed to strongly protect the territorial integrity of member states. Since its inception, African countries have adopted the principle that borders drawn during the colonial era should not be altered. The Resolution on Border Disputes, adopted at the 1964 Cairo Summit (First OAU Summit, AHG/Res.1(I)), declared that “the borders existing on the day of independence are a concrete reality” and stated that all member states would preserve these borders as they existed at the time of independence. In this document, African states made a joint commitment to unconditionally recognize “the borders and territorial integrity existing at the time of independence.” In short, the OAU does not foresee any region within the union of member states gaining a new status through unilateral border changes or secession.
The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000), which serves as the founding document of the African Union, also contains similar provisions. Article 3(b) states that one of the Union’s objectives is “to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of member states”; Article 4(b) adopts as a principle “the preservation of borders existing at the time of independence.” Furthermore, this treaty provides for the peaceful resolution of international disputes. Consequently, the policy of official recognition among AU members includes the principle of not altering existing borders in response to secessionist regions. For example, an AU declaration states that “Article 4(b) of the [African Union] Constitution adopts the principle of preserving the borders existing at the time of independence.” In summary, within the framework of the African Union, there is a common norm regarding the preservation of Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity in response to a secessionist claim such as that of Somaliland. Furthermore, in a 2025 statement by the African Union Council, Somalia’s indivisibility was reaffirmed, and it was noted that no member state had accepted this new declaration.
UN Charter Articles 2(4) and 2(7): Prohibition of Foreign Intervention and Intervention
The relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter restrict international action and intervention. Article 2(4) states: “All Member States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” This rule prohibits the use of force in inter-state relations; however, since the act of recognition does not directly involve the use of force, it is not explicitly contrary to the text. On the other hand, Article 2(7) states, “Nothing in the present Charter authorizes interference by a Member State in the internal affairs of a non-Member State,” thereby emphasizing the UN’s prohibition on interference in internal affairs. Although the article is intended for UN organs, the prohibition on external interference in states’ internal affairs is generally interpreted within this normative framework. A state’s recognition of a secessionist region of another state may be assessed as “political intervention” within this context. For instance, international sources have noted that the swift recognition of a region seeking secession could be viewed as “interference in the internal affairs of the original state” and that such a situation might be contrary to international law. Thus, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland would be assessed primarily through the traditional inter-state principle of “non-intervention” rather than the explicit provisions of the UN Charter. While Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force as a means, Article 2(7) states that intervention in internal affairs cannot be carried out in the name of the United Nations. In this context, while the act of recognition is not legally binding, supporting the secession of one state in a manner that undermines another state’s internal integrity could be considered a political-practical intervention. Consequently, the general principles of the UN Charter and international customs suggest that recognition could be interpreted as an external intervention aimed at altering legitimate borders, even if it does not involve military force.
The Montevideo Convention and the Criteria for Statehood in Somaliland
The 1933 Montevideo Convention lists four fundamental criteria for statehood: a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the capacity to establish relations with other states. Today, these criteria are characterized as generally accepted conditions in international law (within the framework of the declaratory theory). It is claimed that Somaliland largely meets these criteria. The region’s population is estimated to be in the range of several million (approximately 4–6 million). The borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate roughly define a specific territorial area. The Somaliland administration effectively exercises authority within the borders it has established, maintains internal peace through its security forces, and provides public services. Additionally, while not at the level of embassies, Somaliland has established economic and diplomatic ties with some countries independently of Somalia, particularly developing regional trade links through the Port of Berbera. University studies have also emphasized that Somaliland meets the Montevideo criteria. For example, one study noted that Somaliland “clearly meets the requirements for statehood under the Montevideo Convention” and that its recognition is therefore legally indisputable. Consequently, when adopting a declaratory approach, Somaliland can be considered to possess a permanent population, a defined territory, functioning institutions, and the capacity for foreign relations. However, the principle of the inviolability of borders expressed within the AU may prevent the official recognition of a functioning state model, even if these objective criteria are met. Although there is currently no established jurisprudential norm at the OAU/AU level, even the Republic of South Africa has emphasized that Somaliland meets the Montevideo criteria; however, neighboring states such as Uganda and Ethiopia have not recognized it, instead supporting Somalia’s unity (According to Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi, a cooperation agreement has been signed with Ethiopia, but recognition has not yet been granted). Consequently, while Somaliland appears to meet the Montevideo criteria for statehood, international recognition can only be achieved if this situation aligns with the political preferences of other states.
The Binding Nature of Recognition in International Law and the Stance of Other States
In international relations, the recognition of one state by another does not give rise to a binding obligation. The issue of recognition is addressed through two long-debated theories. The constitutive theory of recognition argues that a state’s existence under international law depends on the act of recognition by other states. According to this theory, a new state does not legally exist without recognition. The declaratory theory, on the other hand, regards recognition as a declaratory act; that is, if an entity meets the Montevideo criteria, it is already considered a state, and recognition merely confirms this status. In the practice of international law, the declaratory theory prevails. Although the de facto status of entities that unilaterally declare independence appears to be influenced by the degree of international recognition in practice, from a theoretical perspective, statehood does not require the act of recognition as a mandatory constitutive element. Within this framework, every state exercises its full discretion when deciding whether to recognize another state. There is no obligation: a country may choose to recognize or not to recognize. Therefore, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland does not compel another state to do the same. On the other hand, during the post-colonial era, certain organizations such as the Council of Europe have required newly formed states to assume specific obligations (respect for borders, minority rights, etc.). However, generally speaking, a non-recognizing state has no legally justifiable obligation.
The reactions of other states, however, have been shaped by political concerns. Most UN member states and the African Union have condemned Israel’s recognition and opposed recognizing Somaliland as a state. In particular, 21 Arab, African, and Islamic countries issued a joint statement characterizing this recognition as “a clear violation of international law.” The statement emphasized that recognizing Somaliland as independent would undermine peace and security in the Horn of Africa. For example, Türkiye and Qatar—key allies of Somalia—also reacted to the decision, and many African countries issued statements supporting Somalia’s territorial integrity. Even the USA Department of State, while maintaining diplomatic contacts with Israel in the context of Iran-backed Houthi attacks, has officially reiterated its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. The European Union has also opposed Israel’s move, warning that it threatens regional stability. The prevailing view within the international community, including Türkiye, is that the recognition is politically motivated. Countries such as Canada, Norway, and Italy have also refrained from endorsing Israel’s move, instead issuing calls for stability and leaving the matter to negotiations. As can be seen, the authority to recognize a state is a legally discretionary matter; however, in this specific case, virtually no state has announced that it recognizes Somaliland alongside Israel.
Israel’s Political Objectives and Geopolitical Motivations
Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland is largely driven by regional strategy and geopolitical calculations. First and foremost, the strategic position at the entrance to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is a key concern. On October 7, 2023, the Houthis (Houthi Ansarullah), who supported the failed Israeli operation in Yemen, disrupted maritime shipping, forcing ships traveling from the Mediterranean to the Far East to reroute around Africa. This development has created chaotic conditions in regional maritime trade. Somaliland’s possession of the Port of Berbera in the north could provide Israel with access to this strategic corridor. According to an analysis by The Times of Israel, Somaliland’s location on the coast of the Gulf of Aden, directly south of Yemen, offers Israel a geographically advantageous position for monitoring Houthi movements. Rather than establishing long-term bases for aircraft from continental Europe, stability in Somaliland could provide Israel with early warning and maritime surveillance capabilities. As author Jose Alvarez Gomez notes, Israel’s traditional “peripheral strategy” (a policy of breaking out of isolation by forming alliances with non-Arab and friendly nations) is being continued in this step; just as the Cold War-era African outreach was, so too is the Red Sea and Horn of Africa corridor today.
Additionally, the Somaliland administration has stated its intention to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, at least at the declarative level. A joint Israel–Somaliland statement indicated that Somaliland is expected to join the Abraham Accords (Israel’s normalization process with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco). This development has been interpreted as a continuation of the alliances Israel previously established with its Arab and Muslim neighbors in the region. For instance, while high-level statements from Somaliland have emphasized new partnerships and calls for direct foreign investment, Israel has promised access to logistical channels; it is evident that economic considerations also underlie such bilateral agreements. In summary, from Israel’s perspective, the recognition step serves both its military and intelligence interests in the Red Sea and secures diplomatic gains as part of the Abraham Accords process.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland has officially been the subject of claims of non-compliance with international law. The African Union’s principle of inviolable borders and the obligation to respect Somalia’s territorial integrity do not deem this recognition legitimate. From the perspective of the principles of the UN Charter, while such recognition does not involve direct use of force, it can be characterized as interference in internal affairs. International tradition and state practice indicate that “recognition of a breakaway entity,” though formally legitimate, carries concerns regarding stability. This step is a complex issue shaped not only by legal norms but also by political preferences and historical alliances. From the perspective of the international community, the greatest risk lies in the possibility that other separatist movements might be emboldened by similar legitimizations in the future. For if, even once, international norms or commitments to unity were to encourage the fragmentation of a state, similar situations could set a precedent for numerous groups in the region through a domino effect. On the other hand, the act of recognition is interpreted as a violation of “international procedures and customs” within this broader risk framework; it is emphasized that arbitrarily opening national borders to debate would undermine efforts toward peaceful resolution. For this reason, the general trend in multilateral forums and bilateral relations is toward preserving Somalia’s unity. Despite Israel’s political motivations, the legal binding force of recognition is weak, and it is doubtful that it will produce a result capable of altering Somaliland’s status on the international stage in the face of widespread opposition. However, this situation constitutes a dramatic example of how power balances and strategies in interstate relations intersect with the law.
This article was first published on the Türkiye Research Foundation’s Website on December 30, 2025.
