Imagine a country that produces knowledge and technology related to the use of force for its survival and uses this knowledge to control its environment and ensure its existence and security. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel, which has an area of approximately 4 million km² and is located on 22.072 km² of land, has pursued a proactive and aggressive defense strategy against nine states. As part of an updated version of the Peripheral Strategy Doctrine, which it pursued in the 1950s to enhance its security and overcome the isolation it faced in the region, Israel entered into a strategic partnership with the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) to protect and strengthen its geopolitical interests against countries bordering the Eastern Mediterranean and Türkiye.
Big Games on a Small Island
Geographically located on the trade route connecting the East and West, the Eastern Mediterranean is at the center of regional competition shaped by discovered energy resources, maritime jurisdiction areas, and security architecture. From this perspective, Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean after Sicily and Sardinia, is considered the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean.
In addition to being a fundamental element of the strategic balances in the Middle East, the Balkans, and North Africa, the significance of the Eastern Mediterranean, and consequently Cyprus, has increased even further when considering the magnitude of the hydrocarbon resources discovered in the region. The Eastern Mediterranean will not only be an important hub for energy transfer but will also become an energy center.

On the other hand, Cyprus’s position as a base for forces intervening in crisis areas in the Middle East, as well as its location enabling the use of air power in distant regions, further increases its importance in global and regional policies for the USA, the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and Israel.
With the political and military support of the USA, Israel launched attacks after October 7 that paralyzed the countries in the region. It accelerated its security policies with the Greek Cypriot Administration and Greece, which it has made strategic partners and allies in response to Türkiye’s increasing activity in the Eastern Mediterranean and its strong presence in Cyprus. In this context, despite the Cyprus issue remaining unresolved, the Greek Cypriot Administration signed an Exclusive Economic Zone Delimitation Agreement with Israel in 2010, marking an important milestone in bilateral relations. However, increased military activities and efforts to procure defense industry products over the last five years have become a serious threat to the security of the TRNC and Türkiye. Most recently, the Greek Cypriot side’s receipt of the BARAK MX air defense system, procured from Israel as part of its armament activities, has highlighted this threat. This situation recalls the S-300 air defense system that the Greek Cypriot side ordered from Russia in 1997 but was unable to receive due to intense military and diplomatic pressure from Türkiye.

S-300 Air Defense System Crisis
Following Türkiye’s Peace Operation in Cyprus, a joint defense doctrine was signed between the Greek Cypriot Administration and Greece on November 16, 1993. Under this doctrine, it was emphasized that the Greek Cypriot Administration and Greece constitute an integrated defense area, that Greece would defend South Cyprus in the event of a possible attack from Türkiye, and that such an attack would constitute a cause of war for Greece. As part of this agreement, which was an important step in Greece’s strategy to control the region via Cyprus, joint training and exercises would be conducted between the Greek Cypriot army and the Greek forces on the island, and Greece would play a significant role in military system acquisitions.
One of the most concrete steps regarding the joint doctrine came from the GCA in 1997, following the Imia (Kardak) Crisis. According to the five-year armament program implemented by the GCA administration, the existing airport in Paphos would be modernized to accommodate fighter jets, and the infrastructure of the ports would be renewed to allow Greek warships to be stationed there. The armament initiatives launched by Greece placed a heavy burden on the Greek economy, and the consequences of this became clearer with the financial crisis in the 2000s.
The most significant development following the signing of the Defense Doctrine occurred when the Greek Cypriot side procured the S-300 air defense system from Russia. Priority was given to acquiring these systems to establish air superiority over Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean and to address the gap in air defense systems, which was seen as one of the Greek Cypriot army’s major shortcomings. An agreement was signed between the Greek Cypriot Administration and Russia on January 5, 1997, regarding the procurement of S-300s. These systems posed a serious threat not to Cyprus but to Türkiye, with their powerful search radar (300 km), fire control radar (150 km), and long-range missiles with a range of 150 km.

Türkiye reacted to this situation by declaring it a cause of war. In a statement made on January 14, 1997, Turhan Tayan, the Minister of National Defense at the time, said, “If the S-300s are deployed to South Cyprus, it will mean that an important part of Greece’s encirclement strategy will be realized, and every measure will be taken to prevent such a possibility.” After preventing the Greek Cypriot Administration from taking delivery of these systems, Greece purchased them from the Greek Cypriot side and, in return, delivered Russian-made short-range (15 km) TOR M1 air defense systems. Meanwhile, following this crisis, the Greek Cypriot Administration procured the medium-range (40 km) Buk M1-2 air defense missile system from Russia in 1998 as an urgent requirement.
Faced with Türkiye’s reaction, Greece was forced to deploy the S-300s it had purchased to Crete.
S-300s Become Active in Crete
Greece began to track the Turkish Air Force assets by first activating the radar systems of the S-300s, which had been idle for a long time. Following negotiations with Russia, the Greek military conducted its first test firing with the S-300 on December 13, 2013, after the system became fully operational. It is also worth noting that the currently active systems occasionally harass Turkish warplanes by locking onto them with radar. In addition, Greece offers training and exercise opportunities with the S-300 to the air forces of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and India, as well as the USA, NATO member countries, and Israel, at its test site in Crete.
In addition to analyzing the features of S-300 systems and developing attack tactics for such targets, NATO member countries are provided with Electronic Warfare Training capabilities for their aircraft. Israel has maximized the benefit of this training field by rendering Iran’s air defense ineffective within a few days. This is because Israel has been training its pilots against S-300 systems, which are also in the Iranian army’s inventory, in Crete for many years. These systems have often been used as the enemy in joint exercises between the Israeli and Greek Air Forces.
Until the 2020s The Greek Cypriot Administration had not purchased any new air defense systems. T TOR M1 and Buk M1-2 systems in service were unable to meet the demands of the modern warfare environment, and spare parts and maintenance support from Russia were disrupted. Consequently, the Administration began efforts to modernize the systems that had become inoperable. Furthermore, having rapidly developed its military relations with Israel since the early 2010s, the Greek Cypriot Administration began negotiations in 2021 for the procurement of an air defense system. Following initial discussions focused on acquiring the Iron Dome system, a decision was made to purchase the much more advanced Barak MX air defense system.
The 21st Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces and former member of parliament in 1997, Doğan Güreş, also drew attention to the following points regarding the S-300: “The Russians claim that this is not an offensive weapon, but a defensive weapon. For a country with geographical depth like Russia, this weapon may be a defensive one, but such a system to be deployed in Southern Cyprus is an offensive weapon for us, because it could easily shoot down our aircraft flying in Silifke.” Based on this statement, when considering the military relations between Southern Cyprus and Israel formed against Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Barak MX systems, which are more advanced than S-300s, pose a serious threat to Cyprus and our country’s air and land assets. At the same time, it is an indisputable fact that this system and its radar will be one of the most important components of Israel’s intelligence network in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Israel’s New Move in the Eastern Mediterranean: Barak MX Air Defense System
The Barak MX, produced by Israel Aerospace Industries, is designed to counter threats from fighter jets, UAVs, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. The Barak missile family, consisting of 150 km range Barak ER, 70 km range Barak LR, and 35 km range Barak MR, offers effective interception performance with advanced radar seekers resistant to electronic warfare, dual-pulse motors, and powerful warheads. The Barak MX, with its modular design that can also be integrated into warships, stands out as a low-cost air defense system solution that can be integrated into existing command and control and sensor networks.
One of the most important components of the Barak MX system is the 3D active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar system developed by ELTA Systems, which features gallium nitride technology. With a range of approximately 500 km, the radars can simultaneously detect and track up to 1.100 targets. Additionally, the system is used to detect the location of enemy artillery units within a range of 100 km and can predict the trajectory and impact point of incoming artillery shells, missiles, and mortars in the friendly zone.
After Israel and the Greek Cypriot Side, The Third Leg of the Tripod: Greece
Considering the military relations between the Greek Cypriot Administration and Israel against Türkiye’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the TRNC, Barak MX is a threat that must be taken seriously with its radar and sensor systems. This system will enable monitoring of activities such as tests, training and exercises the Turkish Armed Forces will carry out, especially in times of peace. Given Cyprus’s proximity to Türkiye, the system will monitor the TRNC and our coastlines. Furthermore, considering its technological level, Barak MX will be the most important component of Israel’s intelligence network in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Another country that should not be overlooked here is Greece. It is inconceivable that the Greek Cypriot Administration would procure these systems from Israel on its own without a joint decision with Greece. This is because, as much as it is for Israel, the Greek Cypriot Administration is one of the most important actors in Greece’s the strategy to encircle Türkiye.
Considering recent events in the region, Greece’s regional and global expectations for the coming period are focused on the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean in line with its own interests. At this point, Israel provides Greece with the most strategic support.
Looking back at history, a truly dramatic transformation is taking place. Historically, Greece and Israel, which have had negative views of each other, have been brought together by their opposition to Turkey. Greece officially recognized the State of Israel 42 years after its establishment, in 1990. Relations between the two countries began precisely at this point.
Efforts to develop military cooperation, which began in the mid-1990s, were halted in May 2010, following the breakdown of relations with Turkey after the Mavi Marmara attack carried out by Israel. This accelerated after Netanyahu’s visit to Athens in August 2010, which was recorded as the first official visit by an Israeli prime minister to Greece shortly after the attack.
Relations that took on a new dimension with the joint military exercises that began in 2012, Greece attaches particular importance to its new ally, Israel. This is because Israel is not only a critical military partner but also a defense industry role model as a supplier of military technology. On the other hand, for Athens, Israel serves as a diplomatic channel to further develop its relations with Washington.
After every crisis with Türkiye (1974 Cyprus, 1976 continental shelf, 1987 continental shelf, 1996 Kardak, and 2020 Eastern Mediterranean crisis), Greece, which chose the path of excessive armament, signed a series of cooperation agreements with Israel as part of the modernization of its army.
Greece has added Israel as a military partner alongside the US and France. Türkiye’s advanced defense industry and progress in armed/unmanned aerial vehicle technology, particularly its operational impact in the conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, are being closely monitored by Greece. Türkiye’s growing presence, especially in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, has accelerated Greece’s quest for qualitative superiority in this area. In this context, Greece thinks that Israel’s high-tech defense products can contribute to its own military capabilities with qualitative superiority. Accordingly, activities are ongoing between the two countries for the procurement of UAVs, Barak MX Air Defense Systems, ANTI-DRONEs, radars, electronic warfare systems, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), ammunition, and communication systems. In addition, under an agreement between the two countries, Israel has established a training center for the Greek Air Force, which will operate for 22 years. This center, modeled on the Israeli Air Force training system, aims to enhance Greece’s operational readiness.

Conclusion
After breaking ties with Türkiye, Israel is attempting to build a new security architecture focused on the Eastern Mediterranean but extending from İpsala to the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon, through a multi-layered and proactive strategic approach with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration. Thanks to its technological level, Israel has weakened the dominance of Iran and its proxy forces in the Middle East since October 7, 2023, and has embarked on a quest for regional dominance. The unlimited support of the US has given Israel great confidence. We are witnessing Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration trying to take advantage of this situation. For Israel, Greece, and Cyprus serve as a front yard, a strategic port, and a forward outpost against Türkiye.
Every state can increase its military capacity for security purposes. However, the extreme armament of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration make these two countries more vulnerable to Türkiye. Considering what happened to Ukraine, Türkiye, which has been at the center of various wars for a century, has never lost a conflict it entered. It has a large population, a strong defense industry, and significant influence in world politics, making it a crucial element of deterrence.
Developments in the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Middle East show that tensions will continue in the near and medium term. Despite all the difficulties it has experienced, Türkiye is a result-determined state that does not hesitate to use its high military capacity when it feels threatened, either to itself or its allies. Those who harbor hostile intentions toward Türkiye should never overlook this fact.
This article was first published on the Türkiye Research Foundation’s Website on September 25, 2025.


