Introduction
Lebanon-Israel relations have developed within an almost fateful bond centered on conflict and intractability. Although they have occasionally included short-lived and relatively stable periods, they have generally been shaped by high-intensity conflicts and occupations. Lebanon’s central position in regional conflicts has led to Israel-Lebanon relations becoming increasingly complex and dangerous over time, with this effect continuing to the present day. Israel has been officially at war with Lebanon since 1948; although limited and indirect contacts have been established between the parties at certain times, no lasting diplomatic relations have been established.[1]
While Lebanon’s official rhetoric mostly defines Israel as an “occupying power” or “Zionist entity,”[2] a segment of Israeli society has viewed Lebanon as an “enemy state” due to the presence of Palestinians at one time and the position of Hezbollah today. According to Israel, the Palestinian issue has been a decisive factor, directly or indirectly, at the heart of this security perception. Indeed, the regional developments that emerged with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 were decisive in solidifying this security perception. Lebanon’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the subsequent migration of large numbers of Palestinians to various Arab countries, primarily Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, fundamentally altered the security balance, particularly in the context of Lebanon. In particular, the 1969 Cairo Agreement and the Black September events in Jordan in 1970 increased the presence of Palestinian refugees and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon, directly affecting the country’s internal political balance. The Lebanese Civil War, which broke out in 1975, plunged the country into deep political and military instability, leaving Lebanon vulnerable to military interventions by Israel at various times.
These developments created a favorable environment for Israel’s military intervention in Lebanon in 1978. During the 1980s, a process emerged in Lebanon that reflected a new military phase in the Arab-Israeli conflict. During this period, Israel maintained its military presence in Lebanon, citing Palestinian armed groups as justification. In 2006 and thereafter, new military interventions were carried out in Lebanon under the pretext of Hezbollah; a series of occupations of southern Lebanon have continued since October 7, 2023, and the political and security-based effects of this process extend to the present day.[3] Lebanon, at the center of these developments, has faced persistent tension and conflict in its relations with Israel since the establishment of the State of Israel. In this context, Lebanon-Israel relations will be examined from a perspective spanning from the founding period to the present day, taking into account historical continuity.
Conflict-Driven Bilateral Relations
A series of events that shaped the course of Israel-centered historical developments has made Lebanon a direct part of these processes due to its geographical location. Because of its geographical and historical proximity to Palestine, Lebanon has been forced to directly confront the consequences of the problems arising in the region in various dimensions. The ongoing tension and conflict environment, both in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, has left lasting marks on the collective memory of both societies; this situation has led to the political agenda in both countries being shaped within a security-centered understanding of each other. The Palestinian issue has been at the center of this security perception, either directly or indirectly. Israel’s military operations in Palestinian territories and other neighboring Arab countries, along with Lebanon’s internal wars, assassinations, and chronic security issues, have pushed the country into a vulnerable position, creating an economically and militarily fragile structure.[4]
Lebanon joined the regional Arab alliance that formed against Israel after its establishment and suffered significant military losses during the Arab-Israeli wars. Finally, on October 31, 1949, military operations in the Galilee region ended; with the withdrawal of Lebanese army units stationed along the Lebanese border to the north of the Litani River, the Lebanese army was effectively left out of the fighting. Following this military phase, ceasefire negotiations were held between Egypt and Israel on the island of Rhodes, and the permanent ceasefire agreement, known in the literature as the Rhodes Agreements, was signed between Lebanon and Israel on March 23, 1949.[5] Subsequently, the southern border between Lebanon and Israel was explicitly confirmed in Article 5 of the Lebanon–Israel Ceasefire Agreement dated March 23, 1949. This article states that “the Armistice Line shall follow the international border between Lebanon and Palestine” and explicitly prohibits the armed forces of both sides from crossing the Armistice Line.[6] In this war, which was Lebanon’s first encounter with Israel, the Arab front, of which Lebanon was a part, failed to shift the balance of power in its favor. In other words, the structural inadequacies of the political and military systems of the Arab States became apparent in this conflict with Israel.[7]
Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Lebanon’s security environment, shaped by repeated Israeli military attacks and occupation processes, also profoundly affected the country’s internal political balance. The crisis between President Camille Chamoun and his government and their political opponents, which led to the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in 1958, was considered by the Israeli government to be an internal matter for Lebanon. Indeed, during the establishment of the State of Israel, Israeli leaders expressed their desire for peace with all neighboring states in the Middle East; they pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab world and not to intervene in any way in the national interests of their neighbors. However, a document titled “Lebanon Under Threat from Arab Imperialism,” drafted by the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office on May 22, 1958, contains noteworthy assessments indicating that such neutrality did not exist. The document states that Gamal Abdel Nasser, described as a “dictator,” directly threatened Lebanon, considered one of the freest countries in the region, in line with his policies aimed at establishing an Arab dictatorship in the Middle East. It is stated that Arab fedayeen groups, described as Gamal Abdel Nasser’s agents, caused destruction and chaos in Christian Lebanon, and that following these developments, the Egyptian army threatened to intervene. The document alleges that “the Egyptian leader aims to seize Lebanon, enslave or eliminate the Christian population, and turn the country into a base for new attacks against Israel.”[8]
Another noteworthy aspect of the report is the explicit confirmation of Israel’s desire to cooperate with Maronite Christians. According to the report, Maronite citizens living in Israel applied to an association called Sarhab in Israel, calling on the Israeli government, the public, and all Christian countries on behalf of themselves and the entire Maronite community. The appeal demanded that the Arabs, described as “savages of the desert,” not be allowed to take over democratic and Christian Lebanon. The document also argued that if Israel weakened or Lebanon fell under Arab control, all Christian communities in the East would face similar threats.[9]
Therefore, Israel has viewed preventing Lebanon from becoming an enemy state as a fundamental objective. To this end, it has adopted an approach of contacting numerous minority groups, believing that developing covert cooperation with them would serve its interests, and has exerted considerable effort in this direction. In this context, according to Israel, not supporting the Maronites would not only increase the risk of Israel being perceived as an unreliable partner by other minorities and potential allies but would also weaken the basis of its strategic approach based on the principle of containment.[10] Therefore, the existence of reasons necessitating intervention in the Lebanese crisis alongside the Maronite leadership emerged as a decisive factor in line with the goal of protecting Lebanon’s independence, pro-Western political orientation, and territorial integrity.[11] However, Reuven states that Ben-Gurion pursued a cautious and pragmatic policy toward Lebanon, refrained from using military force in Lebanon, and placed the Lebanese issue low on Israel’s list of national priorities.[12]
Based on the above context, Israel has developed a policy approach that prioritizes its security needs vis-à-vis Lebanon at all times. Israel’s strategic approach was based on the assumption that its own security depended on establishing an appropriate balance of power with Arab states.[13] Indeed, the reflections of this security-based approach on the ground became particularly evident in the 1960s, with a series of clashes occurring in the border regions between Lebanon and Israel.[14] Continuing this approach, during the 1967 War, Lebanon played a limited military role and was not actually involved in the regional war. Nevertheless, Israel unilaterally declared the ceasefire agreement invalid; occupied the Sheba Farms, covering an area of approximately 250 square kilometers, and seized endowment properties belonging to Islamic foundations and the Orthodox Church. In addition, land seizures on various scales continued before and after the emergence of armed Palestinian resistance in southern Lebanon. During this process, Israel has effectively taken control of Lebanese territories around the towns of al-Habbariye and Kefrshuba in the Arkub region, as well as areas around the towns of Aytarun, Dahira, Ayta ash-Shaab, Ramya, Maruahin, and Alma ash-Shaab. As a result of these developments, the international border line stretching from the western foothills of Mount Hermon in the east to Alma esh-Shaab near Nakura in the west has been forcibly and permanently altered to Lebanon’s detriment.[15]
After these years, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon has become a decisive factor at the center of Israel’s policy toward Lebanon. A secret letter dated January 2, 1969, sent by the Israeli Prime Minister to the Lebanese President, clearly reveals how Israel positioned the Palestinian presence within its own security perception and how it approached the border tensions between the two countries within a conceptual framework. The letter states that developments along the Israel-Lebanon border had reached a critical stage by 1969, claiming that “terrorist and sabotage actions” against Israel by armed groups operating from Lebanese territory had increased in both frequency and intensity. The document asserts that these armed organizations openly maintained headquarters in Beirut, conducting their military propaganda and political activities from there. It also draws attention to training facilities established in Lebanon, stating that these facilities operate with the knowledge and support of the Lebanese authorities. It is reported that these elements are particularly concentrated in southeastern Lebanon, near the Israeli border, and that attacks on Israeli settlements are largely carried out from these areas. The letter states that Israel is prepared to establish friendly relations with Lebanon if, from the outset, the Lebanese government prevents its territory from being used for hostile actions against Israel and, in particular, ensures complete calm along the border.[16]
The letter clearly states that the fundamental justification for Israel’s occupation and intervention in Lebanon is the Palestinian presence. Furthermore, Israel claims that during the period leading up to the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime in Syria, the Damascus government sought to establish complete control over Lebanon. The agreement signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Lebanese government in 1969, known as the Cairo Agreement, has also been one of the main arguments for Israel’s foreign policy towards Lebanon. According to Israel’s assessment, this agreement allowed Lebanon to become a center for activities against Israel; after this date, attacks and rocket fire against northern Israel increased significantly. The situation that emerged after the 1969 Cairo Agreement, with the intensification of Palestinian groups’ activities in Lebanon, was part of military interventions shaped by the same security considerations, including the Litani Operation carried out in 1978.[17] The Litani Operation took place approximately one year after the Likud Party, led by Menachem Begin, came to power in May 1977, when the Israeli army invaded Lebanese territory at dawn on March 15, 1978. Approximately 20,000 Israeli soldiers participated in the invasion. The occupation lasted seven days, during which Israeli forces occupied approximately 2,020 square kilometers of Lebanese territory.[18]
The direct justification for the operation was the incident that occurred on the coastal road, known as the “bus attack.” In this attack, 37 Israelis were killed by members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In response to the attack, Israel decided to temporarily occupy a specific area in southern Lebanon in order to weaken the capacity of Palestinian organizations to carry out actions against Israeli targets in the Galilee region. Although the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) declared the PLO militias as their target, civilians paid the heaviest price for the operation. According to some estimates, approximately 1,100 Palestinians lost their lives during the occupation. Following the operation, the PLO shifted its military elements and bases, particularly to the area between the Litani and Zahrani rivers. With the end of the operation, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolutions 425 and 426 demanding Israel’s immediate withdrawal from Lebanese territory. In line with these resolutions, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established to monitor Israel’s withdrawal and ensure the process. As the Israeli army withdrew from the occupied territory, it defined an area of approximately 10 kilometers along the border as a “security zone.”[19]
Following Operation Litani, Israel launched a large-scale military operation in southern Lebanon in June 1982 under the name “Operation Peace for Galilee.” The primary objective of this occupation was defined as pushing the military elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization approximately 40 kilometers north of the Israeli border. After the end of the fighting, Israel maintained its military presence in southern Lebanon.[20]
After the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, numerous opposition movements and civil initiatives advocating for the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanon emerged and gained visibility in the public sphere through large-scale street demonstrations. Many political parties included clear and binding goals for withdrawal from Lebanon in their party platforms. This issue became one of the defining agenda items, particularly during the 1984 general election campaign and, to a lesser extent, the 1999 election campaign. Indeed, during this period, Ehud Barak, the prime ministerial candidate of the Israeli Labor Party, pledged that the Israeli Defense Forces would withdraw completely from Lebanon by July 2000.[21]
The Israeli public largely viewed the destruction suffered by Lebanese society in general, and the suffering endured by the civilian population living in the area defined as the “security zone” in particular, as a secondary issue. The systematic human rights violations suffered by Lebanese citizens and Israel’s long-term, intensive, and continuous military occupation of southern Lebanon have not found a clear counterpart in Israel’s social memory. Following this military intervention, Lebanon was also the scene of intense fighting between June 1982 and June 1985; during this period, 654 Israeli soldiers were killed and, 3.884 were wounded. Between June 1982 and June 1985, 654 soldiers died and, 3.884 were wounded in Lebanon.[22]
Similarly, the 1993 “Reckoning” and 1996 “Grapes of Wrath” operations demonstrated the continuity of Israel’s occupation and military interventions in Lebanon. Israel justified these military engagements on the basis of perceived threats to national security. Discussions within Israeli society over time regarding the presence of the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon have largely centered on concerns about ensuring the safety of Israeli citizens living in the Galilee region and the sustainability of daily life.[23]
From Conflict to Diplomacy: Israel-Lebanon Relations Until the 2000s
While the state of conflict between Israel and Lebanon persisted, various initiatives aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries also came to the fore. One of the prominent figures in these efforts was Bashir Gemayel, leader of the Christian militias.[24] Following his announcement of his candidacy for the presidency, Bashir Gemayel was invited to Jerusalem. This visit was considered a critical threshold in relations between Israel and the Maronite leadership. During this process, Bashir Gemayel stated, “I am not afraid to fight in a divided Lebanon under constant threat from its neighbors,” while also sending a clear message to Israel by saying, “As President of Lebanon, I want to come to Jerusalem and sign a peace agreement with you.” Bashir Gemayel did not openly cooperate with Israel in Lebanon. While this stance was seen as rational and consistent from the Maronites’ perspective, Israel perceived that Gemayel had failed to deliver on his promises. Indeed, according to Choueifaty, following these developments, experts at the Israeli Ministry of Defense recommended withdrawing support for Bashir Gemayel and instead insisted on extending the term of President Elias Sarkis or finding a compromise candidate. However, Ariel Sharon ignored these recommendations and supported the strategy of installing Bashir Gemayel as Lebanon’s leader. It is alleged that during this process, methods ranging from vote buying to threatening Lebanese citizens to vote for Gemayel were employed. Immediately after Bashir Gemayel took office, Sharon moved to create the conditions for signing a peace agreement with him.[25]
Beşir Cemayel stated after the election that peace could not be established without the approval of Lebanese society; during this process, he adopted a more cautious and distant approach towards Israel. However, according to Choueifaty, Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin decided that, as of August 30, it was time for Beşir Cemayel to “pay his debt.” In this context, Gemayel took the first step by meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in Nahariya. While Begin pressed for the establishment of a full and open relationship on the path to a peace agreement, Bashir Gemayel clearly stated that he preferred to maintain the alliance with Israel in a practical and informal manner. Menahem Begin failed to fully grasp the sectarian structure of Lebanon’s political system and disregarded the principle that the Lebanese president should be Christian and the prime minister Muslim. He believed that all the necessary conditions for peace with Lebanon had been met due to the agreement reached with the Maronites and the fact that the president was Maronite. For this reason, the Israeli government insisted on a separate and rapid peace agreement; however, Bashir Gemayel rejected this approach and demanded that the process be revisited after he took office and expanded his political sphere of influence.[26]
Bashir Gemayel also stated that rushing the peace agreement would be unfair and unrealistic; in this context, Begin gave Gemayel until the end of the year. Begin then proposed the appointment of Major Saad Haddad as commander of South Lebanon; however, Gemayel rejected this proposal because Haddad was facing charges of treason. When Begin announced Israel’s intention to maintain a “security zone,” Gemayel argued that this violated Lebanon’s sovereignty and insisted that Israeli forces withdraw to the international border. As a result of these developments, the talks ended in mutual disagreement. According to Choueifaty, Begin complained about Gemayel’s opposition, while Gemayel stated that Begin had adopted a patronizing attitude, giving him orders.[27]
Within Israeli security circles, there was debate over the extent to which Bashir Gemayel should be supported and whether it would be more rational to focus solely on South Lebanon. Some officers in the Northern Command argued that Israel was overly engaged on the ground and recommended withdrawal, proposing instead to strengthen the capabilities of Major Saad Haddad. According to Choueifaty, the possibility of Israel establishing contact with Shiite communities to gain support was also raised during this period. One of the most vocal figures in these discussions was Colonel Eyal Geva. Geva warned that human losses would be high, while political gains would be limited; he stated that the occupation of Beirut would not be sufficient to impose Christian rule on Lebanon, and that Christian supremacy would also need to be established in cities such as Tripoli and Zahle. He also drew attention to the possibility of Bashir Gemayel being assassinated, recalling the example of Anwar Sadat, and argued that the Israeli occupation would create more instability than expected. In August, Bashir Gemayel began directly interfering with Israel’s plans by ordering the liquidation of Palestinians in the Mieh Mieh refugee camp without Israel’s knowledge or consent. During this operation, the Phalangists are said to have committed serious abuses against civilians and engaged in armed clashes with the Druze in the Shuf Mountains. In response to these developments, Israel made a slight shift in its policy, reducing its dependence on Bashir Gemayel and moving to protect its own interests more directly. In this vein, reliable and loyal forces were deployed northward, up to the Zahrani line. However, Israel’s fundamental goal was to hand over all of Lebanon to Bashir Gemayel and his new vision for the state.[28]
Cemayel’s vision, expressed on June 18, 1982, on the “Voice of Lebanon” radio station, reflects an approach that rejects the political order on which Lebanon has relied since 1943 and envisions a new understanding of the state to replace the old structure, characterized by indifference and irresponsibility. However, this vision is fundamentally based on historical traditions and the idea of Christian hegemony rooted in an alliance with Israel. Within this framework, the weak and fragmented old Lebanon would be replaced by a new and powerful Lebanon shaped under the leadership of a strong Maronite community; it was assumed that, if the alliance with Israel was managed correctly, Lebanon could protect both the economic interests of Christian business circles and its relations with the Arab world. On September 12, 1982, Bashir Gemayel and Ariel Sharon met to evaluate the next phase of the plan, in line with Gemayel’s vision of a “Greater Christian Lebanon” and Sharon’s goal of a Lebanon at peace with Israel.[29]
It appears that the then-Director of Mossad, Isaac Hofi, overcame the negative effects of the meeting between Bashir Gemayel and Menachem Begin in Nahariya and reestablished contact with the Israeli government, convincing Ariel Sharon to hold a secret meeting. Following this process, Bashir Gemayel insisted that Hofi ensure that no information, implication, or news regarding the meeting with Sharon be leaked to the outside world. On the evening of September 12, Ariel Sharon departed Tel Aviv by helicopter, accompanied by Isaac Hofi; in accordance with Bashir Gemayel’s request, security measures were minimized, and the journey was undertaken without protection. After landing at the helicopter pad near the power plant in Zuk, Sharon and Hofi were taken by military vehicle to Bashir Gemayel’s home in Bkfiya. Cemayel’s wife and Corc Freyha were also present during the meeting. Ariel Sharon recounts this meeting with Bashir Gemayel in Bkfiya in detail in his memoirs:[30]
“On the eve of September 12, there was a palpable tension in Bkfiya; supporters gathered around Gemayel’s house were bustling with activity, openly expressing their pride and admiration for their leader. In the room where the meeting took place, however, the atmosphere was warm and cordial.”
Sharon stated that he was aware that the unease stemming from the meeting between Bashir Gemayel and Menachem Begin in Nahariya two weeks earlier needed to be resolved first. Sharon expressed that he maintained his stance of protecting Saad Haddad,[31] similar to Begin, while also emphasizing that he understood Bashir Gemayel’s sensitivity on this issue. In the later stages of the meeting, the parties discussed measures that could be taken to rid Beirut of the Palestine Liberation Organization and make the city open and secure. According to Sharon’s account, the parties reached a common understanding that it would be impossible to establish a stable central government if Palestinian armed elements continued to exist in a divided capital. In this context, it was assessed that the expulsion of armed elements remaining in West Beirut was in the mutual interest of both Israel and Lebanon; it was stated that this process could be carried out through cooperation between the Lebanese government and Israeli security forces[32]. This meeting addressed the dismantling of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the future of Palestinian refugee camps.[33] However, just two days after this meeting, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated.[34]
Following this assassination, his brother Amin Gemayel was appointed President of Lebanon. During Gemayel’s presidency, negotiations between Israel and Lebanon began on December 28, 1982, with the mediation of US Special Envoy Philip Habib. The talks, held in Lebanon and in the Israeli cities of Kiryat Shmona and Netanya, lasted a total of 35 rounds; Lebanon was represented by Antoine Fattouh, while Israel was represented by David Kimchi. However, parallel to the arrangement that emerged as a result of these negotiations, a security agreement between Israel and Lebanon was signed on May 17, 1983, with the mediation of the United States. Known as the May 17 Agreement, this arrangement aimed to declare an end to the state of war that had lasted since the ceasefire agreement of March 23, 1949, and to regulate relations between the two countries on the basis of security. The agreement was approved by the Israeli Parliament but did not pass the Lebanese Parliament. The agreement could not be implemented in practice due to the weak state of the Lebanese army, Syria’s continued military presence in Lebanon, and the Arab world’s stance on recognizing Israel. Following these developments, Lebanon announced on March 5, 1984, that it had unilaterally terminated the agreement and, in this context, closed the Israeli representative office that had been opened in Lebanon. The Israeli delegation stated that the possibility of normalization reached between Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and representatives of Lebanese President Amin Gemayel had not been accepted by the Lebanese delegation. However, Israel maintained that Lebanon’s independence could not be guaranteed in any way without Israel.[35]
Based on the above context, Israel aimed to take military action within a framework consistent with its Western and Christian identity, with the goal of making Lebanon a Western-oriented, independent country that was not dependent on the Arab world. However, the perception that Lebanon historically had a weak state structure and its traditional inability to pursue an independent foreign policy were seen as the main obstacles to this goal. Moreover, the trust that Lebanon and the Christian community in Lebanon had in the West, and the West’s willingness to support them, lost its validity starting in the 1950s. Consequently, Lebanon’s foreign policy and the direction of various forces operating in Lebanon shifted towards Arab countries or Iran over these years. Reuven states, “The possibility of an independent and pro-Western Lebanon signing a peace agreement with Israel is quite limited. Lebanon’s structural dependence on the Arab and Muslim world prevents its relations with Israel from being evaluated independently of the Arab consensus.” In this context, it effectively makes it impossible to sign an independent peace agreement with Israel.” This assessment confirms this situation.[36]
Lebanon-Israel Relations from 2000 to the Present
The Israeli army withdrew from the security zone in southern Lebanon on May 24, 2000, after an occupation lasting approximately 18 years. Discussions were held with United Nations (UN) cartographers to determine the exact line of withdrawal for Israeli soldiers; the UN established a withdrawal line without the participation of any representative from the Lebanese government. The line was marked with barrels painted light blue. Approximately six years after these developments, on July 12, 2006, Hezbollah forces intervened against two Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) vehicles conducting routine patrol activities and advancing towards Shtula. As a result of the incident, three Israeli soldiers were killed, two soldiers were wounded, and two soldiers were taken prisoner by Hezbollah. That same night, the Israeli government unanimously decided to launch a military operation, a process that would later be called the “Second Lebanon War.” Israel carried out attacks targeting the country’s infrastructure, primarily Beirut International Airport, in order to put pressure on the Lebanese government. The Second Lebanon War lasted thirty-four days.
In Israeli public opinion, the war that took place in southern Lebanon in July–August 2006 has been regarded as a failure. The government and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) failed to achieve their stated objectives; the army carried out continuous but inconclusive maneuvers against Hezbollah. The civilian population in northern Israel was subjected to intense rocket attacks, and many settlements were evacuated. Henry Kissinger’s statement, “The guerrilla who does not lose wins; the regular army who does not win loses,” found concrete resonance in the Israeli public in the context of this war. Indeed, in the Second Lebanon War, not only Lebanon but also Israel paid a heavy price. During the war, 119 Israeli soldiers and 40 civilians lost their lives as a result of Hezbollah rocket attacks. A report prepared by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee stated that the war caused despair and disappointment in Israeli society. One of the main reasons for the failure was the assumption that the Israeli Air Force alone could eliminate the threat posed by Hezbollah. It was predicted that intensive aerial bombardment would destroy Hezbollah targets and deter rocket attacks; however, the course of the war revealed that Hezbollah’s rocket capacity was not significantly affected.[37]
Diplomacy: Between Cooperation and Conflict
The strategic situation created by the 2006 War has led Israel to develop a more multidimensional strategy that addresses both security and economic interests, rather than relying solely on military means in its subsequent relations with Lebanon. In this context, the potential benefits that an agreement on Israel’s northern maritime border would bring to the energy sector have been at the center of assessments in recent years. Over the past decade, various initiatives have been undertaken to resolve the dispute over the route of Israel’s northern maritime border. These initiatives, including mediation efforts by the United States, have failed to produce concrete results, and the disagreement between the parties has persisted for a long time. Consequently, this process has not contributed to improving the energy sector and general economic conditions in either Israel or Lebanon.[38]
The permanent resolution of the maritime border dispute between Israel and Lebanon has created the potential for the first cooperation in the production of natural gas resources that could contribute to the economies of both countries. The agreement encompasses security and political interests as well as economic benefits and expectations related to the energy economy. Furthermore, the agreement has strengthened the possibility of international energy companies increasing their activities in Israel’s existing natural gas reserves and in fields likely to be discovered in the future. This development is expected to have positive effects on Israel’s energy economy and provide significant financial gains for the country.[39] Indeed, a report prepared by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense on October 7, 2022, and approved by the Chairman of the National Security Council, specifically emphasized that the signing of the agreement was of vital importance for the State of Israel in terms of realizing urgent security, political, and strategic interests, along with economic and energy advantages.[40] However, no lasting success has been achieved in the potential energy agreement envisaged between Lebanon and Israel. Following Israel’s occupation of Gaza after its Operation Flood of the Al-Aqsa Mosque on October 7, 2023, Hezbollah announced its support for the resistance in Gaza and carried out low-intensity attacks on a limited number of military targets on the Israeli side of the border. Although these developments led to a limited conflict between the two sides, they did not escalate into a full-scale war on the Lebanese front until the September 17, 2024, pager explosions. Nevertheless, Israel has carried out attacks on points it considers Hezbollah centers in Lebanon’s interior, particularly in the Bekaa and Syria, whenever it has had the opportunity. In late July 2024, Israel assassinated Fuad Shukr, described as one of Hezbollah’s top military officials, and also targeted leading figures in the organization’s military wing. On September 17, Israel carried out an intelligence operation, detonating 3,000 pagers carried by Hezbollah members, killing dozens of party members and civilians and injuring thousands. On September 19, bombings targeting Hezbollah leaders were carried out in the southern suburbs of Beirut; the operations quickly turned into a large-scale air campaign covering various areas in southern Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley.[41]
Israel assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah on September 27 and targeted his successor, Hisham Safiyuddin, on October 3. With these actions, Israel aimed to comprehensively eliminate the Hezbollah threat by weakening Hezbollah’s command structure, human resources, and military capabilities. It also sought to politically undermine Hezbollah and reshape the sectarian balance in Lebanon. Another objective was to pave the way for Lebanese actors to be more willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel to gain power. Therefore, Israel’s ongoing campaign of airstrikes against military and civilian centers it believes are linked to Hezbollah is part of this policy.[42] It is likely to continue targeting factories and agricultural areas in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Since the ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel came into effect on November 27, 2024, Israeli forces have continued to raid various Lebanese areas in the south and east and target Hezbollah positions.[43] Recent developments indicate that achieving lasting and comprehensive peace for Lebanon depends on finding a fair solution between Lebanon and Israel. Similarly, in the context of the Palestinian issue, recognizing the right of the displaced Palestinian population in Lebanon to return to their homeland has also emerged as one of the fundamental elements of this process.[44]
Conclusion
Relations between Lebanon and Israel have historically developed along the axes of conflict, security, and occupation. Although there have been partial diplomatic openings, these initiatives have not achieved lasting success. The question of whether a relationship centered on peace can be established has been directly linked to the scale and nature of the conflict between Lebanon and Israel. Lebanon’s conflict with Israel has been two-sided. On the one hand, the conflict is political, military, and legal in nature; Israel’s occupation of Lebanese territory is a fundamental problem area. A political and legal solution could eliminate the possibility of war, but this is often achieved on the basis of a de facto suspension of military conflict. On the other hand, the factor determining the nature of Israel-Lebanon relations has been demands to eliminate anti-Israel organizations in Lebanon, rather than achieving a fair and comprehensive political solution to the conflict. Therefore, Lebanon has been unable to establish official relations with a state that has occupied its territory without denying its identity as an independent state. This is because Israel’s demands conflict with Lebanon’s existence as a democratic and national state. Israel’s policy toward Lebanon has been shaped around the goal of eliminating all existing or potential armed groups, completely and effectively dismantling Lebanese and Palestinian military organizations, and fully and unconditionally reestablishing state authority through unconditional disarmament. This situation reinforces assessments that Israel has recently positioned itself in the Middle East as an actor that undermines security and is politically immature.
When assessed from Lebanon’s perspective, the problem with Israel has not been shaped by religious antagonism; Lebanon has not been in direct conflict with Judaism. Israel’s interventionist and occupying approach towards Lebanon has been shaped in the past by the Palestinian presence and, today, by Hezbollah’s close relations with Hamas and Iran. Therefore, the basis of the conflicts between Lebanon and Israel has been Israel’s policy of occupation, primarily of Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese territories.
Footnotes:
[1] Ṣādiq al-Shirʿ, Hurūbunā maʿa Isrāʾīl, 1947–1973: Maʿārik Khāsira wa-Intiṣārāt Ḍāʾiʿa [Our Wars with Israel, 1947–1973: Lost Battles and Misplaced Victories] (Amman: Dār al-Shurūq li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1997). 255.
[2] Sadiq al-Shirʿ, Hurubuna maʿa Israʾil [Our Wars with Israel], 255.
[3] Ḥabība Ghayba, Al-Ijtīāḥ al-Isrāʾīlī li-Lubnān (1982–1985) [The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon (1982–1985)] (Biskra: Jāmiʿat Muḥammad Khayḍar–Biskra, 2016), 13.
[4] Sadiq al-Shirʿ, Hurubuna maʿa Israʾil [Our Wars with Israel], 9.
[5] Sadiq al-Shirʿ, Hurubuna maʿa Israʾil [Our Wars with Israel], 255.
[6] Palestine’s borders with Lebanon and Jordan were based on the international borders established between 1921 and 1923. The border with Egypt had been established in 1906. Moreover, Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders were determined based on the borders defined in the 1926 Lebanese Constitution. Article 1 of the Constitution stipulates that Lebanon’s southern border with Palestine follows the existing southern borders of the Sur and Merciiyyun regions. This border-line was accepted in accordance with the Paulet-Newcombe Agreement signed between France and Britain in 1923. As a result of this arrangement, seven villages whose inhabitants were Lebanese citizens and which were located within the borders of Greater Lebanon declared in 1920 were not legally recognized as part of Lebanese territory. Secondly, Lebanon joined the United Nations as a founding member in 1945 within the framework of these international borders specified in the 1926 Constitution. Thirdly, following the armistice agreement, these previously defined international borders were effectively demarcated by the Lebanon-Israel Mixed Committee established under the supervision of the United Nations. This demarcation process was broadly parallel to the border determination made after the Paulet-Newcombe Agreement, but included some limited changes around the east of Metulla and the Hasbani River. Despite this, Israel did not fully comply with the ceasefire line; it continued to maintain control over parts of the villages of Yarun, Rumeyyiş, Aytarun, Blida, Meys el-Jebel, Hula, Adise, and Kefr Kila. Mufāwaḍāt bayna Lubnān wa-Isrāʾīl: Taswiya – Salām – Niẓām Iqlīmī Jadīd? [Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel: Settlement – Peace – A New Regional Order?], Silsilat al-Shaʾn al-ʿĀmm fī Qaḍāyā al-Nās: Needs and Research, Planning and Prospects (Zuq Muṣbaḥ: Sayyidat al-Luwayza University, 2000), 99–100.
[7] Mufawadat bayna Lubnan wa-Israʾil [Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel], 145.
[8] Israel State Archives (ISA), Israel–Lebanon Relations, 1956–1958, ג/5570/8, December 27, 2016.
[9] Israel State Archives (ISA), Israel–Lebanon Relations, 1956–1958.
[10] Kirsten Schulze, Diblūmāsiyyat Isrāʾīl al-Sirriyya fī Lubnān [Israel’s Secret Diplomacy in Lebanon], çev. Antwān Bāsīl (Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿa li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1998), 98.
[11] Schulze, Diblomasiyyat Israʾil al-Sirriyya fi Lubnan [Israel’s Secret Diplomacy in Lebanon], 98.
[12] Reuven Erlich, Milḥemet Levanon ha-Rishona: Mah hayu maṭarot ha-milḥama u-mah hayta hashpaʿato shel ha-modiʿin ʿal qabbalat ha-haḥlaṭot she-hovilu la-milḥama [The First Lebanon War: What Were the War’s Objectives and What Was the Impact of Intelligence on the Decision-Making That Led to the War?] (Merkaz ha-Meida le-Modaʿin u-le-Teror ʿal Shem Aluf Meʾir ʿAmit, June 1, 2015), 13.
[13] Schulze, Diblomasiyyat Israʾil al-Sirriyya fi Lubnan [Israel’s Secret Diplomacy in Lebanon], 98.
[14] Mufāwaḍāt bayna Lubnān wa-Isrāʾīl [Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel], 146-147.
[15] Mufāwaḍāt bayna Lubnān wa-Isrāʾīl [Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel], 99-100.
[16] Israel State Archives (ISA), Israel–Arab and Lebanon Relations, vol. 2, 3871:2/חצ, November 20, 2016.
[17] Israel State Archives (ISA). Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Lebanon File, חצ-8443/2. June 12, 2017.
[18] Jaber Suleiman, “Israel’s Wars on Lebanon, 1978-2024: A Comparative Approach,” Institute for Palestine Studies, Policy Paper, Issue: 119, (6 Nov. 2024): 3, https://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/attachments/policypapers/Jaber%20Suleiman%20ENG%20119.pdf.
[19] Be-Tselem, Hafarat zekhuyot ha-adam shel ezraḥei Levanon be-yedei Yisraʾel [Violation of the Human Rights of Lebanese Civilians by Israel] (Jerusalem: Merkaz ha-Meida ha-Yisraʾeli li-Zekhuyot ha-Adam ba-Shetahim, January 2000).11.
[20] The complete withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from southern Lebanon was confirmed by the UNIFIL Commander on June 13, 1978, and recorded in the Secretary-General’s progress report (5/12620/Add.5) on the same day. Israel State Archives (ISA), חצ-8443/2; The south of the Litani is theoretically under the control of the United Nations Emergency Force in Lebanon (comprising French, Irish, Fijian, Nepalese, Norwegian, Nigerian, and still a few Iranian troops). Israel State Archives (ISA), חצ-8443/2. Regarding southern Lebanon, France, concerned that its relations with the Arab world could be damaged, has adopted a more cautious line, developing a policy of neutrality that does not impose a solution on the parties. In line with this, it reduced the number of troops in UNIFIL, withdrew its operational forces, and chose to maintain a presence primarily through logistical units.
[21] Be-Tselem, Hafarat zekhuyot ha-adam shel ezraḥei Levanon be-yedei Yisraʾel [Violation of the Human Rights of Lebanese Civilians by Israel], 12.
[22] Be-Tselem, Hafarat zekhuyot ha-adam shel ezraḥei Levanon be-yedei Yisraʾel [Violation of the Human Rights of Lebanese Civilians by Israel], 12.
[23] Be-Tselem, Hafarat zekhuyot ha-adam shel ezraḥei Levanon be-yedei Yisraʾel [Violation of the Human Rights of Lebanese Civilians by Israel], 12.
[24] Beşir Cemayel, 23 Ağustos 1982 tarihinde Lübnan Cumhurbaşkanı seçilmiştir.
[25] Clovis Choueifaty, Al-Insiḥāb wa-al-Intikhāb: Maʿārik Sūriyya wa-Isrāʾīl fī Lubnān [Withdrawal and Election: Syrian Battles and Israel in Lebanon], vol. 5 (Jubayl: Suwgrāf, 2012), 156–157.
[26] Choueifaty, Al-Insiḥāb wa-al-Intikhāb [Withdrawal and Election], 156-157.
[27] Choueifaty. Al-Insiḥāb wa-al-Intikhāb [Withdrawal and Election], 156-157.
[28] Choueifaty. Al-Insiḥāb wa-al-Intikhāb [Withdrawal and Election], 156-157.
[29] Choueifaty. Al-Insiḥāb wa-al-Intikhāb [Withdrawal and Election], 156-157.
[30] Choueifaty. Al-Insiḥāb wa-al-Intikhāb [Withdrawal and Election], 124-125.
[31] Major Saad Haddad, who broke away from the Lebanese Army and led an Israeli-backed militia in southern Lebanon, was Israel’s closest ally in Lebanon for many years. As the ruler of a narrow strip of land along the Israel-Lebanon border, he waged a fierce war against Palestinian guerrillas in southern Lebanon. Edward Walsh, “Lebanese Militia Leader, Saad Haddad, Dead at 47: Israel Pays Tribute to Its Ally in Fight Against PLO,” Washington Post, January 15, 1984, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/01/15/lebanese-militia-leader-saad-haddad-dead-at-47/d5456a5b-f209-4e43-b71a-8904dc8d378e/.
[32] Choueifaty. Al-Insiḥāb wa-al-Intikhāb [Withdrawal and Election], 124-125.
[33] Choueifaty. Al-Insiḥāb wa-al-Intikhāb [Withdrawal and Election], 156-157
[34] Masa u-matan bein Yisraʾel le-Jumayyil [Negotiations between Israel and Jumayyil]. Maʿorka, January 7, 1983, 2; Clovis Choueifaty. Al-Insiḥāb wa-al-Intikhāb [Withdrawal and Election], 156-157.
[35] Masa u-matan bein Yisraʾel le-Jumayyil [Negotiations between Israel and Jumayyil], 2.
[36] Erlich, Milḥemet Levanon ha-Rishona [The First Lebanon War], 9.
[37] Durūs Mustakhlaṣa min Ḥarb Lubnān al-Thāniya (Tammūz 2006): Taqrīr Lajnat al-Khārijiyya wa-al-Amn fī al-Knesset al-Isrāʾīlī [Lessons Learned from the Second Lebanon War (July 2006): Report of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the Israeli Knesset], çev. A. Abu ʿĀmir, (Beirut: Markaz al-Zaytūna lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Istishārāt, 2007), 11–12.
[38] Medinat Yisraʾel, Misrad ha-Mishpatim [State of Israel, Ministry of Justice]. Official letter no. 7235 (2022, October 11).
[39] Medinat Yisraʾel, Misrad ha-Mishpatim [State of Israel, Ministry of Justice]. Official letter no. 7235.
[40] Medinat Yisraʾel, Misrad ha-Mishpatim [State of Israel, Ministry of Justice]. Official letter no. 7235.
[41] “The Israeli Gamble: A Prolonged, All-Out Regional War,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, November 3, 2024, https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/israeli-gamble-prolonged-all-out-regional-war.
[42] “The Israeli Gamble: A Prolonged, All-Out Regional War,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies.
[43] Amerika: Multazimūn bidafaʿ Lubnān wa-Isrāʾīl naḥwa salām mustadām [America: Committed to Pushing Lebanon and Israel toward Lasting Peace]. (2026, January 26). Al Arabiya. https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/2026/01/26/اميركا-ملتزمون-بدفع-لبنان-واسرائيل-نحو-سلام-مستدام.
[44] Mufāwaḍāt bayna Lubnān wa-Isrāʾīl [Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel], 146-147.
This article was first published on the Türkiye Research Foundation’s Website on Fabruary 24, 2026.
