Introduction

The growing social unrest and waves of protests in Iran are calling into question the regime’s internal legitimacy while also bringing the positioning of opposition actors back into the spotlight. In this context, Reza Pahlavi has emerged as a prominent figure through his rhetoric appealing to both domestic opposition groups and Western actors; he is attempting to position himself as a potential alternative for Iran’s future. This analysis aims to examine Reza Pahlavi’s quest for legitimacy and his strategy for securing external support within the context of the Iranian protests.

Reza Pahlavi is the son of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, who was overthrown in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Born on October 31, 1960, Pahlavi is 65 years old and is referred to by his supporters as the “Crown Prince of Iran.” Pahlavi has been in exile for approximately 45 years since the 1979 revolution and currently resides in the USA. Pahlavi grew up in luxury as the Shah’s crown prince. His father, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ascended the Iranian throne in 1941 with British support, ruled the country during his reign as a pro-Western, elite-centered, authoritarian regime characterized by unequal income distribution. Indeed, the social backlash against the Shah’s regime culminated in the overthrow of the regime in 1979, when millions took to the streets. This historical legacy has had a profound impact on Reza Pahlavi’s identity, serving both as an advantage and a disadvantage.

Criticism of the Regime and His Position Within the Opposition

Reza Pahlavi is a complex figure within the Iranian opposition. While he is a “symbol of hope” for his supporters, he is viewed as a “symbol of division” by some within the opposition. He faces significant criticism, particularly from opposition activists who do not want a return to the monarchy. The legacy of his father’s regime and his connection to the monarchy are key factors that set him apart from other opposition groups. Nevertheless, he is believed to have played a crucial role in mobilizing and directing the protests that began over economic hardships and evolved into an anti-regime movement.

Reza Pahlavi describes the current Iranian regime as a “theocratic dictatorship” and argues that it has long since lost both its political and religious legitimacy. He characterizes the regime as a structure that “wages war against its own people” and “holds its citizens hostage.” According to Pahlavi, the regime’s execution of political prisoners and its blocking of internet access are clear indications of how much the government fears its own people; and this state of internal insecurity, when combined with concerns that the regime’s nuclear activities pose a serious risk to regional and global security, reinforces warnings that Iran could increasingly follow a North Korea-like trajectory and transform into an unwanted and dangerous actor within the international system. However, Pahlavi notes that the current regime is “at the root of all problems” and that negotiations are “futile” because it will never change its behavior.

Therefore, according to Pahlavi, the wave of protests emerging in 2025–2026 represents a critical threshold for a fundamental transformation of the Iranian regime. The opposition leader, noting that the regime’s repressive apparatus is weakening day by day and that this situation is creating a balance in favor of the people, views this weakening as an ideal groundwork for a “final uprising.” Pehlevi’s messages, in which he assures protesters not to “leave the streets” and promises to “be by your side soon,” have been rebroadcast by Farsi-language satellite channels and have played a significant role in mobilizing the public to take to the streets. Pahlavi argues that these protests demonstrate that the Iranian people have united against the regime regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds and therefore claims that there is no risk of civil war in the country.

Promises to the Iranian People: A Democratic Future

Reza Pahlavi positions himself not as a figure seeking power, but as a facilitator of a transition process that will lead Iran toward democracy. In this context, he offers the following promises to the Iranian people:

• Leading the Democratic Transition Process: He presents himself as a leadership candidate dedicated to governing the country through peaceful means and preparing it for a democratic future.
• Constituent Assembly and Referendum: He aims to lay the groundwork for a “constituent assembly” that will determine the final form of government. He emphasizes that the final decision will be made by the people through a national referendum.
• Form of Government: He states that whether the future regime will be a republic or a constitutional monarchy depends on the people’s decision. He asserts that he is not running a personal campaign, but rather that his goal is to ensure the democratic process.
• Secular Democracy: Pahlavi describes the Islamic Republic as a “religious theocracy” and “religious dictatorship” that holds the people hostage. He argues that the strongest antidote to this system is a secular democracy based on the will of the people. In his own words, his goal is not to bring back the past, but to build a democratic future for all Iranians. For this reason, unlike the current regime, he promises a “secular democracy.”
• Inclusivity and National Reconciliation: In the post-regime era, he proposes an inclusive future in which even the military, paramilitary, and civilian elements of the current regime, except for those “with the blood of the people on their hands,” could become part of the new structure. He states that his aim is to prevent chaos like what occurred in Iraq.

International Relations and Nuclear Policy

Pehlevi promises the international community that peace and stability will be guaranteed with the removal of the current regime. He pledges that a democratic Iran will respect all international agreements it has signed, particularly the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). He expresses his personal view that the new Iran should not adopt either a civilian or a military nuclear policy. He argues that this would prevent other countries in the region from entering a nuclear arms race and would bring peace to the region.

Reza Pahlavi is calling on Western actors, particularly the USA and Europe, to openly and strongly support regime change in Iran. Emphasizing that the previous approach of appeasement has failed to produce results, Pahlavi states that the current regime should not be offered a “lifeline.” He also advises global leaders to acknowledge the ineffectiveness of negotiation processes with the regime and to invest in the Iranian people, whom he views as the true guarantors of peace and security.

In addition, Pahlavi regards Israel and the USA as strategic allies or tools for weakening and overthrowing the current Iranian regime. Arguing that Israel and the USA’s military actions have boosted the confidence of anti-regime factions, Pahlavi stated in an interview with the BBC regarding Israeli attacks that “anything that weakens the regime is positive,” noting that ordinary Iranians are not being targeted and that any development weakening the regime would be welcomed by many Iranians.

Another significant point in the debates is Pahlavi’s 2023 visit to Israel, during which he met with Prime Minister Netanyahu. This visit has caused serious polarization among the opposition and the public. In fact, following this meeting, Pahlavi began to be labeled by certain circles as the “Zionist Shah.” Despite all the criticism, Pahlavi sought to legitimize this initiative by stating in his remarks regarding the visit that he could cooperate with any power, including Israel, to liberate Iran without jeopardizing national interests. In this context, by arguing that a democratic Iran would not pursue nuclear weapons and would contribute to regional peace, he is extending an olive branch to Israel and the USA and aims to secure the political and strategic support of these actors.

Conclusion

Those calling for the return of the Pahlavi dynasty present him as a legitimate alternative to the current regime and a unifying figure. Indeed, pro-monarchy slogans such as “Javid Shah” (Long Live the King) and “Pahlavi will return” have echoed in many cities, including Tehran, Isfahan, Arak, and Zanjan. The modernization and rapprochement with the West attributed to the Shah’s era are perceived by some protesters as a sign of “normalization” when compared to the current economic collapse.

This perception stands out as a key factor in strengthening Reza Pahlavi’s legitimacy within the opposition. The “National Cooperation Convention to Save Iran,” held in Munich in July 2025, demonstrated that Pahlavi’s support extends beyond his traditional base. Representatives from various groups, including Kurds, Baluchis, Christian minorities, and LGBTQ+ activists, attended this meeting and presented Pahlavi as a “bridge” for a democratic transition. However, despite this support, there are serious criticisms and doubts directed at him among opposition groups due to concerns that Pahlavi might adopt a monarchist orientation and pursue a line centered on Persian nationalism.

In his appeals, Pahlavi addresses not only regime opponents but also military and civilian personnel within the regime, inviting them to switch sides and offering them amnesty. According to his own statements, over 50,000 regime members have established communication channels with him. However, it appears that Pahlavi, unlike his father’s authoritarian past, is positioning himself as a democratic actor; he is attempting to instill confidence in all Iranian society by emphasizing that the final form of government, whether a republic or a constitutional monarchy, should be determined by the people through a free referendum.

Many Iranians still remember the political repression, censorship, and torture carried out by the secret police force SAVAK during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Those who criticize him express their concern that one “appointed leader” will simply be replaced by another. Leftist groups, the People’s Mujahedin Organization (MEK), and some Republicans openly reject Pahlavi’s leadership. In particular, a significant portion of Kurdish, Turkish, Arab, and Baluchi groups oppose Pahlavi’s supporters, arguing that an inclusive government cannot be established under Pahlavi’s leadership.

Pahlavi’s nearly half-century in exile has led to objections that he is out of touch with the sociological realities of modern Iran and the dynamics of younger generations. His pro-Israel and pro-USA stance has cast him as a “representative of foreign powers” in the eyes of the Iranian people. This relationship is viewed as a risky strategic partnership that could undermine Pahlavi’s legitimacy both among the nationalist and conservative base within the country and among Muslim allies in the region. Acting within this framework, some opponents argue that such closeness could harm Iran’s regional interests and the people’s nationalist sensitivities, potentially placing the country under the influence of Israel and the USA.

However, it appears that Israel and the USA are hesitant to give Reza Pahlavi their full support. This hesitation stems from the uncertainty surrounding Pahlavi’s actual popular support within Iran, the fragmented nature of the opposition and past failed experiences with exiled leaders. Furthermore, Israel approaches Pahlavi with suspicion due to its strategy of not wanting a strong state in the region. According to this view, an Iran under Pahlavi’s leadership that is democratic and integrated into the international system could, in the long term, re-emerge as a powerful actor in regional competition, thereby limiting Israel’s strategic superiority. The reason Tel Aviv is currently supporting Pahlavi is his divisive influence within Iran. Washington has adopted a similar stance, and President Trump’s statement that he would wait to see the definitive outcome of the protests before openly supporting an opposition leader point to this indecision.

The fact that Israel and its Western allies do not currently view Reza Pahlavi as the “sole and definitive” option for Iran or hesitate to offer him full support can also be interpreted as part of a broader strategy. Indeed, Pahlavi’s divisive legacy within Iranian society and the strategic risks he poses could be functional from Israel’s perspective; after all, one of Israel’s core interests is not a strong and stable Iran but a weak and unstable one.

This article was first published on the Türkiye Research Foundation’s Website on January 16, 2026.