Lebanon must take swift action to ensure that Hezbollah surrenders its weapons through negotiation, without succumbing to any external provocation.However, the likelihood that Hezbollah will not disarm in the near future, and that tensions will escalate, is another major source of concern in Lebanon.

Lebanon must take swift action to ensure that Hezbollah surrenders its weapons through negotiation, without succumbing to any external provocation.However, the likelihood that Hezbollah will not disarm in the near future, and that tensions will escalate, is another major source of concern in Lebanon.

Is Tension Rising Again?

The Israeli attacks on Iran, launched on June 13, have had a serious impact on Lebanon, a country that has endured Israeli aggression for many years. While the ongoing clashes between Israel and Hezbollah remain relatively low-scale (düşük ölçekli), the failure of Lebanon’s newly formed government to gain the support it hoped for from Donald Trump in the face of Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon has made the risks Lebanon faces in the Iran-Israel war more visible.

In this context, although Lebanon is currently trying to maintain calm amid rising tensions, the fragile balance of its internal dynamics reveals the fact that the country is likely to be heavily affected by this war as well.

Hezbollah – The Shiites and Iran

Following Israel’s early morning operation, attention initially turned not only to Iran but also to Hezbollah. However, Hezbollah made a clear statement that it would not join the war. Given that after October 7, Hassan Nasrallah failed to take the expected action and Hezbollah’s threats against Israel remained purely rhetorical, the new leadership’s silence in this war was an anticipated stance.

That said, it is evident that Hezbollah’s position between October 7, 2023 and June 13, 2025 has not been shaped by the same dynamics. One possibility is that Iran abandoned Hezbollah during the Gaza war, and with Nasrallah’s death, these claims gained traction. Alternatively, Nasrallah’s decision to remain restrained is interpreted as an internal reflex (iç refleks) aimed at preventing Lebanon from becoming a direct target of Israel.

Indeed, Hezbollah sought to preserve its military strength without launching attacks on Israel, while at the same time demonstrating its sense of responsibility—first to the Shiite community and then to all of Lebanon—by attempting to keep the Israeli threat at bay.

However, by choosing not to enter the war directly, Hezbollah not only failed to gain any strategic advantage, but instead, due to its silent resistance, suffered what may be the greatest destruction inflicted by Israel.

Currently, with its military power diminished, Hezbollah has adopted a core strategy of staying in the shadow of the Iran-Israel crisis in order not to lose its remaining leverage—its political legitimacy (siyasi meşruiyet).

Indeed, even during the post-October 7 clashes with Israel, Hezbollah lost public support. Should it risk Lebanon on behalf of Iran, this would likely be the single most critical factor leading to the organization’s collapse.

Therefore, despite lengthy statements by Hezbollah officials declaring their support for Iran, none of these declarations are truly convincing. Rather than severing ties with Iran altogether, the organization seems primarily focused on ensuring its own survival.

The most important point that must not be overlooked in either approach is that the ideological bond between Hezbollah, the Shiite community, and Iran remains strong.

This connection has two dimensions: a general one concerning Lebanon as a whole, and a more specific one focused on the Shiite population. The fact that, aside from the Druze, each of the sectarian groups that retain political weight in Lebanon is supported by external actors forms one of the foundational aspects of the Lebanon–Iran relationship.

Given that Lebanon has a predominantly Shiite population, and that this population resides along the Israeli border in the south, as well as in critical areas such as Dahiye in a relatively small city like Beirut, the Lebanese government is constantly reminded to maintain as calm and cautious a diplomatic relationship with Iran as possible.

On the other hand, the “never again” (bir daha asla) argument, which similarly exists in the collective psychology of the Shiite community, keeps alive the desire to feel Iran’s presence—at least to a minimal extent—as part of the process of preserving their identity.

Although due to the currently ambiguous relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, the Shiites may not defend Iran as strongly as they once did, they are not prepared to completely abandon the Iranian regime or the doctrine of Velayet-e Faqih (Velayet-i Fakih).

For this reason, every blow inflicted upon Iran by Israel and the growing threat of regime collapse in Tehran is perceived as a heavy burden by Lebanese Shiites. Consequently, they express that they will not abandon their attachment to Iran, in order to offer psychological support to Tehran.

The Lebanese Government’s Concerns

It is known that immediately after the election of President Joseph Aoun, his strong reaction against the use of Lebanese territory—describing the Israel–Palestine conflict as “someone else’s war”—sparked objections from Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem.

Today, however, the Lebanese government has issued a direct order to Hezbollah not to intervene in the war, and the fact that Naim Qassem has shown no reaction to this directive indicates that maintaining harmony between the two sides has become imperative.

Behind the Lebanese state’s clear and increasingly vocal stance toward Hezbollah lies a deep sense of concern. Israel’s ongoing occupation of southern Lebanon—and the likelihood that it will not end anytime soon—combined with Tel Aviv’s pressure on the U.S. to withdraw UNIFIL from the southern border, has created a highly tense atmosphere.

In such a context, Lebanese decision-makers are striving to avoid becoming further targets of Israeli strikes. For even the slightest move by Hezbollah could very well drag Lebanon back into the devastating “Dahiye days” (Dahiye günleri).

On the other hand, Lebanon is well aware that if Israel emerges victorious from its war with Iran, it will once again—and this time even more ruthlessly—turn its attention toward Hezbollah and launch a new war.

For this reason, it requires no further explanation (izaha muhtaç görünmemektedir) that Lebanon must take swift action to ensure that Hezbollah surrenders its weapons through negotiation, without succumbing to any external provocation.

However, the likelihood that Hezbollah will not disarm in the near future, and that tensions will escalate, is another major source of concern in Lebanon.

Therefore, any victory Israel might achieve against Iran will deepen Netanyahu’s regional domination, and the damage caused by this deepening will be felt most acutely in Lebanon—second only to Palestine.

This article was first published in Kritik Bakış on June 19, 2025.