The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) Summit, held in Warsaw on April 28-29, holds special significance as it marks the 10th anniversary of the initiative. This platform, established in 2015 under the leadership of Poland and Croatia, was created to address deficiencies in energy, transport, and digital infrastructure between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas, strengthen regional integration, and increase connectivity along Europe’s north-south axis. Over time, especially with developments as the Ukraine War and the energy crisis, the 3SI has evolved from merely an infrastructure-focused development project to one that also possesses a geopolitical security dimension.
Since 2015, the European Union has faced consecutive crises: the refugee crisis (2015), Brexit (2016), the rise of far-right movements, the COVID-19 pandemic (2020), and the Ukraine War (2022) have shaken Europe’s political and economic stability. These crises have increased the burden on its locomotives, such as Germany and France, and the unity of the EU has been questioned. Consequently, structures like the 3SI, which connect Central and Eastern Europe and strengthen transatlantic cooperation, have become more strategically valuable.
New Europe in the East of the Atlantic
The US is one of the strongest supporters of the 3SI. This support is not coincidental; rather, it reflects Washington’s positioning of Eastern Europe as an alternative strategic partner axis following the diplomatic tensions experienced with Western Europe during the 2003 Iraq War. The opposition of Germany and France to the US-led military intervention was met with a serious reaction in Washington; then-US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld characterized Germany and France as “old Europe.” Rumsfeld clearly stated that the US’s new focal point was Central and Eastern Europe, saying: “You’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. That’s ‘old Europe’. If you look at the whole of NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the East”.
This rhetoric formed the foundation of the close relations the US established with the new NATO members in Eastern Europe and symbolized the axis shift in transatlantic relations. Eastern European countries were the most loyal supporters of the US regarding the Iraq intervention, while traditional allies like Germany and France were criticized. Over the years, this approach has become institutionalized, paving the way for the strategic support of regional initiatives such as the 3SI.
Indeed, US officials who attended the first 3SI summit drew attention to the initiative’s potential for NATO’s development in Europe, and key US leaders, including Donald Trump, openly expressed their support for this structure. The US’s 300-million-dollar fund donation and 1-billion-dollar investment commitment revealed that Washington views this initiative not just as an economic but also as a geostrategic lever.
In this context, Poland holds a special position. Developing a strong alliance with the US due to the influence of its historical experiences, Poland has undergone a notable transformation both economically and militarily. The unemployment rate, which was 20% in 2003, decreased to 4.9% as of 2024; concurrently, defense spending has increased to 4.2% of its gross domestic product (GDP), reaching one of the highest rates among NATO countries. The goal for 2025 is to increase this rate to 4.7%. Poland’s increasing weight within NATO also enhances the 3SI’s strategic value in the eyes of the US. All these developments indicate that Poland is progressing toward becoming one of Europe’s new locomotive powers.
Türkiye in the New Security and Logistics Map
Although not an official 3SI member, Türkiye is a central actor in both Black Sea security and energy and logistics lines. Ankara’s connection in the energy corridors extending from Central Asia to Europe and its military contribution under the NATO umbrella make it an indispensable cooperation partner in the region. Projects such as the Middle Corridor and the Development Road specifically reinforce Türkye’s strategic role in providing a secure and uninterrupted connection between Asia and Europe. These infrastructure breakthroughs directly overlap with the 3SI’s priority projects, such as Via Carpatia, increasing Türkiye’s potential contribution to the initiative.
Türkiye’s participation in the 3SI with the status of a “Strategic Partner” has formalized this multidimensional cooperation and made the country’s potential contributions to the region more visible, especially in areas like energy supply security, the development of transport networks, and the strengthening of digital infrastructure. Its experience in public-private sector cooperation offers an important model for Europe’s infrastructure investment target of approximately 550-billion-euros needed by 2030.
Moreover, Türkiye has established a closer and more pragmatic cooperation network with Eastern European countries compared to Western European countries in terms of political and economic relations. Partnerships focused on energy, defense and transportation developed with countries like Hungary, Poland and Romania are accelerating Türkiye’s integration process with the 3SI geography. Considering increasing energy demand and security concerns, Turkey is strengthening its position as a strategic actor supporting Europe’s supply security, establishing a critical logistics and security network across a wide region extending from the Black Sea to Central Asia and from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Caucasus. The new Eastern Mediterranean dimension created by the 3SI’s expansion to include Greece further positions Türkiye centrally in this geographical equation. Türkiye’s contributions in the region are poised to play a key role in determining the future effectiveness and geopolitical weight of the 3SI.
Worn-Out Locomotives, Changing Routes
The dynamics emerging in the 3SI’s 10th year clearly demonstrate that power balances in Europe are shifting. The traditional locomotives of Western Europe, such as Germany and France, have largely lost their function as a continent-wide center of attraction due to their weakened political influence and limited strategic vision following consecutive crises -the refugee crisis, Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Ukraine War. This situation has compelled the small and medium-sized states in Central and Eastern Europe to seek new cooperation networks that will strengthen their security and economic development.
The 3SI, gaining strength with the active support of the US, has become a platform that responds precisely to these needs. In this new security and development axis, countries like Poland are stepping forward, while Türkiye is also becoming an increasingly important actor thanks to its regional and global connections, its strategic role in energy and logistics lines, and the close relations it has developed with Eastern European countries. Despite its non-official membership, Türkiye is one of the few countries that can directly contribute to the 3SI’s goals of energy security, transport infrastructure, and geopolitical balance.
Within this framework, it is evident that the future geopolitical structure of Europe will be shaped by a multi-centered, flexible structure based on regional cooperation, rather than solely a Western-centric vision. Türkiye’s active contribution to this process will be decisive not only for the 3SI but also for the holistic security and resilience of the European continent.
This article was first published on the Türkiye Research Foundation’s Turkish website on May 2, 2025.
